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ABSTRACT
Despite growing usage of meditation in Western psychotherapeutic practice, there is a
divergence in the meaning of empty self-experience between psychodynamic psychotherapy and
the Buddhist source of these meditative practices. In this theoretical study I propose that empty
self-experience is manifold, including both beneficial and pathogenic forms, specifically the
experience most prized in Buddhism as sunyata, and those most dreaded in personality disorders.
By studying these through the theories of control-mastery and Buddhist Abhidhamma, I
demonstrate how similar psychological processes are involved in overcoming pathogenic
emptiness, on one hand, and in the achievement of sunyata, on the other. The findings suggest
an approach to pathogenic emptiness that views it as comprised of pathogenic beliefs and
employs meditation as a powerful adjunct to disconfirming these beliefs. Future research is
suggested through which outcomes are compared between groups involved in control-mastery
interventions for pathogenic emptiness, with the experimental group engaged in meditation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“I do not teach theory. I analyze.” – Buddha
The word “emptiness,” when referring to an experience or a feeling, conjures up the
notions of depletion, insubstantiality, hollowness, deadness, or incompleteness. A “glass half
empty” is never considered a good thing even if in essence it is the exact same thing as a “glass
half full.” To those of us who hail from Western culture—those cultures heavily influenced by
the traditions of the Renaissance, Protestant Reformation, and the Enlightenment movement of
Europe and America—feeling empty is a sign that something has gone awry and we are not well.
When severe, we may feel that we are empty of our very essence, our self, in conflict with the
expectation that we should feel solid and substantial; it is better to be “full of one’s self” than
empty.
On the other side of the Earth there are those who strive for emptiness. To them, having
a sense of a fixed self, solid and essential, is the primary source of suffering. Embracing
transience and a relativistic view without grasping to an illusory core is the way to find true
contentment and optimal psychological functioning. Rather than feeling hollow or dead, this
experience makes one feel more alive and part of the world. Those who follow this line of
thinking draw from any number of long traditions of Buddhist practice dating back to the 6th
century BCE. The method of practice they engage in to cultivate this experience is meditation.
Meditation has become a solid fixture in many psychotherapy practices in the Western
world. Thanks mostly to research on mindfulness meditation, evidence-based approaches like
dialectical behavior therapy (DBT) and acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) have rapidly
become mainstream, and are widely practiced in clinical settings (Linehan, 2001; Semple & Hatt,
2012). The style of meditation referred to as “mindfulness” comes from Buddhism, and the
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practice is inextricably located within a larger context that includes metaphysical, religious,
cultural, and psychological frameworks and is one part of a complementary set of practices used
to achieve greater and greater levels of psychological and spiritual health.
This psychological framework of Buddhism is described in some of its earliest
documents collectively called the Abhidhamma (Aylward, 2007; Bodhi, 2000; Olendzki, 2008;
Thera, 1998). This framework describes in great detail various mental states including those that
are adaptive and those that are maladaptive or pathogenic. In it, the capacity for and practice of
meditation is woven into the very fabric of the healthier mental states, appearing as the presence
and strength of various “mental factors.” It also carefully elucidates the purpose of meditation as
a means of cultivating progressively healthier mental states towards an ultimate goal of complete
liberation from suffering.
This goal sounds lofty and practically unattainable to the ear of one who is steeped in
Western psychotherapy traditions. Even so, these traditions use the physically and emotionally
calming and centering effects of mindfulness meditation as an adjunct to other psychotherapeutic
techniques. The goal of these techniques is to attain an acceptable level of functioning,
embracing a view that “complete liberation from suffering” is not possible. But to achieve even
an average level of happiness, a strong, rooted sense of self is essential. On the surface, then, it
appears that mindfulness meditation as a therapeutic technique is being used towards an opposite
goal than that of its original context in Buddhism; it is a tool to save one from emptiness that
leads to suffering, rather than a tool to achieve emptiness that leads to salvation. This is a
startling difference between the Western and Buddhist traditions, and it gets to the very
definition of mental health. It is striking that each of them employs similar techniques to what
seem to be vastly different ends.
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For Buddhism, the self exists, but not in a fixed and abiding way. In this way it is said to
lack inherent existence, while it does exist relatively. Indeed, this is the keystone of Buddhist
psychology (Huntington, 1989; Komito, 1987). This notion is referred to by the term
“emptiness” (sunyata), and while it applies to all phenomena, its key psychological implications
appear in relation to the self. In this sense, a narcissistic attachment to a fixed image of self as
either something or nothing causes suffering. As Rank (1978) described it, our basic suffering is
rooted in a kind of original separation anxiety, which he called a “fear of life” (p. 124). We fear
what has already irrevocably happened—separation from the greater whole—and yet we also
come to fear the loss, in death, of this precious individuality (Rank, 1978). Mindfulness
meditation is the primary tool to ameliorate this, as espoused by the Buddha in the Satipatthana
Sutta: “Monks, this is the one-way path for… the surmounting of sorrow and lamentation, for the
passing away of pain and dejection, for the attainment of the true way… namely, the four
establishments of mindfulness,” (Bodhi, 2005, p. 281). Hence, meditation’s essential position
within the Fourth Noble Truth—“the means of ending suffering.” Its main purpose is to cultivate
the lived experience of sunyata, allowing one to experience the self in its relativistic and
transient reality. According to Epstein (1995a), “the Buddha's teachings might be read as an
attempt to establish this reality principle with regard to the appearing self. Just as we distort the
true nature of pleasurable sensory experiences, so we also consistently distort the self-feeling,
inflating or deflating it in a perpetual attempt to fix an acceptable image of self in mind” (p. 61).
By contrast, Western psychology has historically associated a strong sense of self as a
hallmark of mental health. It is the natural product of the healthy functioning of the ego.
Furthermore, the experience of “emptiness” is often cited as a troubling sign of emotional
disturbance and is considered diagnostic of some disorders such as borderline personality

4

disorder (BPD). Meditation in psychotherapy is therefore primarily used in ego-supportive roles
for benefits such as relaxation and managing intense affect. On the one hand, within Buddhism
the primary goal of meditation is to alter self-experience (by achieving sunyata). On the other
hand, an altered self-experience is a common therapeutic achievement. Overcoming pathogenic
emptiness, for example, would involve a shift to a new self-experience. Despite this, altering
one's self-experience is not the explicit goal of meditation practice within psychotherapy as it is
in Buddhism.
The psychoanalyst and Buddhist scholar Jack Engler (1983) has succinctly summarized
these positions: “The two great developmental achievements in the all-important line of object
relations according to ego psychology—identity and object constancy—are seen by Buddhist
analysis as the root of mental suffering” (p. 35). Here we see two starkly different takes on
emptiness as it applies to self-experience: one of ultimate health and the other of pathology. And
in each context, the same technique is being used to alleviate suffering. In other words, the same
technique is used by one group to help achieve the experience of emptiness, and by the other to
treat those for whom an empty self-experience is seen as pathogenic. Even more puzzling: there
is evidence for improved psychological health in both cases (Grenard, 2008; Linehan, 2001;
Shelton, Sampl, Kesten, Zhang, & Trestman, 2009).
Pathogenic emptiness is a prominent feature of many disorders, including depression and
many of the personality disorders: borderline, narcissistic, and schizoid (Jorgensen, 2010;
Kernberg, 1975; Singer, 1977). The high correlation between identity disturbance and suicidal
ideation (Muehlenkamp, Ertelt, Miller, & Claes, 2011) makes it an especially important issue for
social workers to consider in the context of psychotherapy. It is of great interest, therefore, that
some techniques using Buddhist meditation have been developed specifically with some of these
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disorders in mind. For example, DBT was developed with the intent of reducing suicidality in
those with borderline personality organization (Clarkin, Lenzenweger, Levy, & Kernberg, 2007;
Linehan, 1993). The correlation between identity disturbance and suicidality on the one hand,
and the centrality of emptiness (sunyata) in Buddhist practice on the other warrants a close
examination of the differences in between the empty self-experiences of pathological conditions
(disorders) and those that result from Buddhist practice.
In this study, I examine empty self-experiences, both adaptive and maladaptive. Given
the strong association in the psychological literature between identity disturbance and suicide
(Singer, 1977), understanding the differences between the two is all the more crucial for clinical
social workers treating clients vulnerable to pathogenic self-experiences of emptiness. If
Buddhist practice is to be used to help those with these forms of psychopathology, we can begin
to address the question of the different types of empty self-experience by conceptualizing
pathogenic emptiness within the framework of classical Buddhist psychology. This will allow us
to place pathogenic emptiness adjacently to sunyata and to understand the former in terms of the
conceptual framework that defines the latter.
Similarly, emptiness will be examined through the lens of control-mastery theory, a
psychoanalytic approach that derives from ego psychology (Silberschatz, 2005; Weiss, 1993;
Weiss & Sampson 1986). Control-mastery theory (Weiss, 1993) holds the empirically-validated
claim that a vast range of pathology results from pathogenic beliefs which are, in essence, the
individual's attempt at adaptation. The individual is continually "testing" the veracity of these
beliefs and reevaluating them. Using control-mastery theory (CMT) allows an approach to
emptiness as a pathogenic belief as well as a legitimate attempt at adaptation to their relationship,
surroundings, and the world in an existential sense.
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It is with these theoretical lenses that I examine the vicissitudes of empty self-experience.
In Chapter II, I provide a more in-depth discussion of the theoretical orientation and
methodology of the study. Following that, in Chapter III, I describe and discuss various forms of
emptiness, including some aspects of their psychodynamics, and provide case examples.
Chapters IV and V elaborate in further detail Buddhist Abhidhamma and the theories of ego
psychology and CMT, respectively. The final chapter, Chapter VI, examines both modes of
emptiness using these theoretical frameworks and discusses the implications of my findings for
social work practice and further research.
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II. METHODOLOGY
“How can one know anything at all about people?” – Anna Freud
The interest of this study is in the therapeutic implications of experiences of emptiness.
There are a number of reasons why an empirical approach to this is difficult. For example,
conducting a controlled experiment would be unethical without understanding the risks involved
in introducing intensive Buddhist mediation to subjects suffering from severe pathological
emptiness. We may understand these risks better by conceptualizing both healthy and
pathogenic forms of emptiness within a single framework that may be used in further studies.
Such conceptualization is essential to any empirical study for collecting relevant data. A
thorough conceptualization of emptiness within a theoretical framework that could be used as the
basis of empirical (qualitative or quantitative) research is all but absent (Aylward, 2007). For
this reason, this study takes a theoretical approach over an empirical one. In doing so, it may
perhaps begin to address this gap and provide justification for further research.
The theories selected are control-mastery theory—including concepts from ego
psychology with which it is closely related—and classical Buddhist psychology. Controlmastery theory (CMT) is a psychodynamic theory with a history of empirical research, making it
one of the few psychodynamic therapies that may be considered evidence-based (Weiss &
Sampson, 1986). It developed out of ego psychology, including and expanding upon its
understanding of ego functioning and defenses. Theorists of ego psychology have done some
considerable work on the condition of pathogenic emptiness. And while some notable writing
has been done on non-pathogenic, healthy, emptiness from an ego psychological point of view, it
is all but absent from control-mastery theory and remains mostly the purview of Buddhist
thought. Buddhist psychology and practice, on the other hand, is almost entirely organized
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around the experience of emptiness (sunyata). Although the therapeutic practices for each of
these theories differ (with some striking similarities to be discussed further on), they each have a
systematic, structural metapsychology that provide this study with a rich “grammar” for framing
the ego functioning involved in experiences of emptiness.
Below I provide a brief discussion of terminology. Following that is an overview of the
relevant aspects of the two theories mentioned above, including the way they are used to
examine the phenomenon of emptiness. Finally, I discuss potential biases and strengths or
weaknesses of this study.
Definitions
Self-experience. The way one experiences one’s own being. It is informed by one’s
own past experiences, and one’s understandings and assumptions. In turn, it also constitutes a
framework organizing one’s experience of self-in-world.
Emptiness. Emptiness may refer to wide range of subjective experience. As the focus of
this study, it is meant to refer to empty self-experience. Although it may include a feeling or
mood that may be characterized by the same term, it refers more specifically to the felt quality of
one's identity or being. I use the term emptiness in referring to both beneficial and pathogenic
forms. When necessary, I use pathogenic emptiness to differentiate emptiness related to intense
states of suffering, such as those experienced by those with depression or some character
disorders. Empty self-experiences that are not considered pathogenic in most contexts are
simply referred to as non-pathogenic emptiness, and this category includes the more specific
Buddhist concept of sunyata.
Sunyata. This is the Pali word for “emptiness” (lit. “nothingness” or “voidness”) used in
Buddhist doctrine, and this refers to the experience cultivated in Buddhist meditation which is
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the antidote narcissistically-rooted suffering. Although the concept of sunyata applies to all
existent phenomena, I use the term to refer specifically to self-experience apart from any
ontological claims about sunyata within Buddhist doctrine. In Buddhism, the ontological
emptiness of the self is referred to by the term anatta (“no-self”), but for simplicity this term is
used only when it must be distinguished from sunyata.
Buddhism. Buddhism is a rich and complex tradition with many, sometimes quite
divergent, paths. Although the perception in the West is that Buddhism is a meditative or
contemplative tradition, there are a minority of branches that are devotional in nature (Japanese
Jodo Shinshu is one example). In the present context, Buddhism refers to the first sort. Further,
because of the central role of psychology in the contemplative forms of Buddhism we refer to,
Buddhism is also used as shorthand for Buddhist psychology. When necessary, I distinguish
Buddhism as a religion from Buddhism as a psychology.
Abhidhamma. The “higher teaching” of Buddhism is a collection of canonical texts that
deal with the nature of consciousness by applying a highly methodical and detailed
metapsychology. Occasionally the term may be used in adjectival form as abhidhammic to
indicate that the accompanying term should be understood within this context.
Meditation. There are two types of meditation common to most types of Buddhism.
Although distinct, the techniques are similar and they are practiced together. Even in tantric
traditions that employ a great variety of techniques such as visualization practices, the two basic
forms of concentration (samatha) and insight (vipassana) meditation are still a foundational
practice (Hayward, 1998). The generic term “meditation” encompasses both of these types, and
may also refer to non-Buddhist techniques in context. The phrase “mindfulness meditation”
connotes the sense of “mindfulness” invoked by the Abhidhamma as a mental factor that is
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honed in both types of meditation is. The phrase “mindfulness meditation” therefore refers to
Buddhist meditation in general (Olendzki, 2011). When necessary, I distinguish between
concentration and insight meditation in their particular roles in the experience of emptiness.
Defense mechanisms. The concept of defense mechanisms (or simply “defenses”) was
originally introduced in Sigmund Freud’s structural model (Freud, 1920), and later emphasized
and expanded upon by ego psychology (Freud, 1937), and plays an important role in controlmastery theory (Silberschatz, 2005). Defenses protect an individual from four kinds of
psychological “danger” arising from id/ego/superego conflicts, interpersonal conflict, conflict
with social norms or institutions, and disruption of psychological equilibrium due to trauma
(Schamess & Shilkret, 2008). The anxiety produced from these conflicts is classified into four
types according to the developmental level with which they are associated. From
developmentally early to mature, these are: annihilation anxiety, fear of the loss of the object,
fear of the loss of the object's love, and what's still sometimes referred to as “castration anxiety”
(Freud, 1924). Correspondingly, the defenses used to combat these anxieties are classified along
a developmental continuum. McWilliams (1994) classifies defenses into primary (or primitive)
and secondary (higher-order) defense mechanisms. The primary defenses, while effective at
reducing anxiety, often involve more gross distortions of reality and hence interfere with an
individual's overall level of functioning. Secondary defenses are more adaptive, often more
transient, and cause less dysfunction. Even someone who has successfully developed higherorder defenses may still have recourse to earlier defenses when faced with significant stressors.
Pathogenic belief. This is a term from control-mastery theory referring to the (usually)
unconscious beliefs one has about oneself and others. These beliefs are formed in response to
traumatic experience and represent distortions in the understanding of self, others, and the
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relationships between the two. They may once have been adaptive, but in their present form they
cause dysfunction and suffering to the individual who holds them, and often to the people in that
person’s life.
Testing. “Testing” is another term from control-mastery theory. CMT holds that
everyone is naturally inclined to mastery, and one way this manifests is that one will test the
validity of a pathogenic belief within present relationships in the hopes of disconfirming it.
According to CMT, the therapeutic project is for the therapist to anticipate these tests and “pass”
them, enabling the patient to disconfirm their underlying pathogenic beliefs.
Theory: Buddhism
The main concern of Buddhist psychology is exactly the same concern of Western
psychotherapy: understanding and alleviating psychological suffering. This is nowhere more
plainly stated than in Buddhism's most basic tenets, the Four Noble Truths:
1. That suffering is endemic to life.
2. The cause of this suffering is known.
3. Since the cause is known, it can be cured (or alleviated).
4. The Eightfold Path: the technique to alleviate suffering.

The first truth asserts that suffering suffuses our daily lives. The reason our experiences
cause psychological suffering is due to the three forces of ignorance, craving, and aversion.
Ignorance refers to the attribution of solidity or permanence to phenomena that are inherently
transient (empty). Having attributed this solidity, in the mind there is now some “thing” which is
judged to be desirable or undesirable, to be attained or denied (Aylward, 2007). Craving refers
to the attachment to this mental image that one believes to be real (solid, permanent). This is
sometimes called “desire” in the literature, but the term “craving” carries the sense of discomfort

12

as well as some level of unattainability of the desired object, both of which are central to the
Buddhist understanding of this force (Epstein, 1989). Aversion is in the literal sense the opposite
of craving, yet it is also in response to the misapprehended object. Both attachment and aversion
lead to suffering. Aversion is self-evidently a form of suffering, while attachment leads to
suffering since the object desired can never be fully attained since it does not exist in the way it
is perceived. Moreover, its ephemeral nature inevitably leads to the experience of loss or
disappointment. This formulation may be applied to the self-experience: the fixed image of self
leads to suffering because of the mutable, impermanent nature of the self. One can be attached
to a particular image of the self and averse to another, and neither is of enduring substance.
Knowing that suffering comes from craving, aversion, and ignorance, it logically follows
that if we are able to mitigate these three forces, it would alleviate our suffering. The Eightfold
Path is the way in which Buddhists undertake this. It is Buddhism's "psychotherapy." It can be
roughly divided into three branches: ethical conduct, mental development, and wisdom. Ethical
conduct is thought to form a foundation for the other two branches (Aylward, 2007). (There are
numerous reasons for this, some metaphysical, and some practical for the monastic life that was
central to classical Buddhism.) Mindfulness and concentration practices are referred to in the
second branch, mental development, and correct understanding with correct intention (wisdom)
the third. Correct understanding refers to, among other things, the (intellectual) acceptance that
all things including mind and body are impermanent or empty. These branches are inextricably
linked, and it's important to note that meditation, for example, is not pursued without correct
understanding.
The practice of meditation (mindfulness and concentration—the second branch of the
Eightfold Path) is the method through which the experience of sunyata is cultivated. But
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concentration practices pre-date Buddhism, and one can take many things as the subject of
concentration. This is the reason for the importance of the third branch, that meditation is
undertaken with at least a conceptual understanding of emptiness, and with the purpose of
deepening that understanding and experiencing its reality. This way the practitioner's attention is
on the self, and eventually begins to experience its emptiness. Through years of practice, these
fleeting insights become more frequent and long-lasting, and are cultivated into a cognitive
framework that influences one's perceptions in an ongoing manner in daily life, allowing one to
live (ideally) free from psychological suffering (Komito, 1987). In fact, an orientation around
sunyata can be seen in all the of the Eightfold Path; for example, accepting the truth of emptiness
of one's self means that one should act selflessly (ethical conduct).
In Chapter IV, the phenomenology of this transformation is discussed in more detail. It is
understood through the components of consciousness as described in the canonical texts of
Buddhist psychology collectively known as the Abhidhamma, or "higher teaching." These
components are metapsychological structures used to describe both ordinary and meditative
states of consciousness. This study uses these structures in conceptualizing the experience of
sunyata, and then attempt to apply these structures to specific cases of pathogenic emptiness.
Pathogenic emptiness is more readily identified in the Western psychological literature, having
received much less treatment from a Buddhist perspective. One form of it in Buddhist literature
comes from the discussion of the contrast between sunyata and nihilism; Buddhism considers the
latter an experience of emptiness based on the delusional reification of voidness as an enduring
“nothing.” This is referred to as the craving for "being" and the craving for "non-being"; a
“narcissistic craving” for a fixed image of self as being either something or nothing:
When that [craving] occurs with the eternalist view, 'Lasting, eternal', as basis, that is
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called craving for being, for it is the lust accompanying the eternalist view that is called
craving for being. And when that [craving] occurs with the annihilationist view,
'Breaking up, perishable', as basis, that is called craving for non-being, for it is the lust
accompanying the annihilationist view that is called craving for non-being.
(Buddhaghosa, 1976, pp. 567-568)
Theory: Control-Mastery
According to most Western psychological theories with roots in ego psychology, a
strong, cohesive self is a sign that the mind and its various components are functioning well and
in harmony (Singer, 1977a, 1977b). These components perform a variety of functions including
testing and modifying one's understanding of the world and others, and leveraging of defenses
against psychic conflict (defense mechanisms). The healthy and harmonious functioning of
these components produce an integrated and cohesive sense of self. It’s therefore inferred that
should some of these components “malfunction,” it may lead to a disturbing sense of emptiness
from the lack of a cohesive sense of self.
In the clinic, the founders and proponents of control-mastery theory observed that the
“malfunctioning” of ego components is correlated with unconscious pathogenic beliefs—
distorted beliefs about reality and relationships causing one to engage in self-defeating behavior
and leverage painful defenses against the psychic conflict caused by them. One can think of
pathogenic beliefs as a sort of “pragmatic misunderstanding” of reality. They are pragmatic in
the sense that these distortions occur in response to early trauma, broadly defined as painful
interactions with one's caregivers or significant others. They are a way of adapting to a difficult
environment. Over time their pernicious nature begins to take a toll due to their
misrepresentation of others and the world at large; they do not apply to the broader context,
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hence leading to maladaptive behavior and more suffering.
Although pathogenic beliefs are persistent, control-mastery theory holds that human
beings have an innate drive to master them. We are constantly testing the validity these beliefs
with others. Given the right environment, these tests are "passed," and pathogenic beliefs are
weakened or disconfirmed. The task of the CMT therapist is to create such an environment and
pass these tests, allowing the client to establish more adaptive beliefs about themselves and the
world around them which, of course, alleviates their suffering.
Chapter V describes this theory in more detail, and in the final chapter the concepts of
pathogenic beliefs and testing from CMT is be used to examine pathogenic emptiness as well as
sunyata. I do so by describing the ego functioning involved in pathogenic emptiness described
in the literature, then doing the same for sunyata. Framing eternalist or annihilationist views of
self—the poles of "narcissistic craving" (Epstein, 1989)—in light of pathogenic beliefs makes
available the explanatory power of testing and defensive processes from within a Buddhist
framework which understands those views of self as delusional or “pathogenic” as well.
Biases
The theories I use to examine emptiness have been selected in part due to their
“structural” approach to describing psychological processes. This approach is useful in
grounding the discussion of the experience emptiness—an abstruse subject, especially in its
transcendental forms—with tangible concepts. However, such structural approaches lend
themselves to reductionism; a common criticism of Western philosophy and science (Pope,
1982) which has occasionally been leveled against the works of the Abhidhamma (Thera, 1989).
These approaches should therefore be “held loosely” as tools for understanding, keeping in mind
that the phenomena being described transcend the sometimes mechanistic language of these
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theories.
Buddhism is a religion as well as a psychology. As such, its psychology is ensconced in
a web of metaphysical assertions including rebirth, deities, and karma. Since my primary
concern is in the use of Buddhist practice in Western psychotherapy, I am excluding much of its
metaphysical and ontological assertions. In this I run the risk of omitting context in the same
fashion that has been done in appropriating meditation to Western psychotherapy. My hope is
that because focusing on experience and phenomenology is in line with much of Buddhist
literature (including the Abhidhamma), this is an acceptable scope within the Buddhist tradition
that is not antithetical to that tradition as a whole.
Some of the more rigid systemization in the Abhidhamma can also present some
challenges in applying the system to Western scientific understandings of psychopathology. For
example, the “unwholesome universal” mental factors always occur together in any so-called
unwholesome state of mind. One of these mental factors is restlessness, which co-occurs with
suspension of conscience and suspension of respect, among others (Olendzki, 2011). This
suggests that one cannot be calm and relaxed while committing misconduct that involves a lack
of conscience. However, in current Western understanding, it appears that many individuals who
may be classified as psychopaths are able to do just that; recent scientific studies on psychopathy
appear to even show a correlation between low anxiety and the willingness to endorse personal
harm (Koenigs, Kruepke, Zeier, & Newman, 2011).
One can speak neither of psychoanalysis nor Buddhism without considering the role of
gender. Each has its roots in patriarchal worldviews, and each has attempted to reconcile with it
in different ways as it has grown and changed with modernity. Control-mastery theory was
developed in the 1960s and 1970s (Schamess & Shilkret, 2008, p. 89), occurring within a period
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of psychodynamic theorizing about gender consisting of what Berzoff (2008) terms as a
“difference” perspective (p. 232). This perspective assumed that boys and girls assimilated to
rigid gender roles from within the context of an unequal nuclear family where the mother is the
primary caregiver—the “stay-at-home mom”—and the father was the “bread-winner.” As a
result, boys “developed their gender identities by first separating and individuating from their
primary love objects, their mothers” and as a result the boy’s sense of self depends upon
becoming “more boundaried, more differentiated, and more autonomous than that of girls”
(Berzoff, 2008, p. 234). By contrast, a girl develops a sense of self “in the context of a
continuous relationship with her mother,” resulting in “more permeable ego boundaries with
greater capacities for empathy than do boys” (Berzoff, 2008, p. 234). The selfless, empathic,
submissive role of women in this society is seen as a result of oppression from patriarchal social
order. Individuation and independence being the prized developmental achievement in
psychoanalytic thought, the relational and empathic aspects of women’s roles were pathologized.
This view was critiqued by some feminists of the time who reframed the capacity for
connectedness and empathy as virtues and positive adaptations. Additional postmodern critiques
of this view according to Berzoff (2008) is that it takes the privileged, white, hetero-normative
position as the norm without accounting for the varieties of gender experiences and parenting
including situations where there is a single parent, where both parents work outside of the home,
gay couples, and people of color, for example.
CMT emerged from the psychoanalytic climate of that era and may be subject to some of
the same biases. Its almost exclusive focus on pathogenic beliefs and testing allows CMT,
makes it simplistic and practical enough that these issues may remain in the background.
Additionally, like other psychoanalytic theories of the era, CMT holds separation and
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individuation as paramount developmental achievements, and many of its formulations of
pathogenic beliefs center around reasons, such as survivor guilt (Weiss, 1986), that this step has
not been taken or is incomplete.
Buddhism was founded as a monastic tradition dominated by male monks or bhikkhus.
Traditional sources speak of the Buddha’s reluctance to establish an order of female monastics.
When eventually he did do so, it was done with an additional 84 rules of conduct (311 for
bhikkhunis versus 227 for bhikkhus) which persist in many Buddhists sects to this day. It was
also more difficult for females to be ordained and subordinate to monks (Harvey, 2000). There
have been many modern efforts to rectify this situation, notably in Tibetan and American
traditions. Despite this, the texts and ideas from which I draw come from some of the earliest
traditions of Buddhism, and therefore almost certainly were the product of an oral tradition
created by men, recorded in writing also by men, and influenced by a very specific patriarchal
worldview.
Race and class, too, play roles in the worldview in each of these theories. Since its
inception, psychoanalysis has been mostly dominated by white and privileged men. For this
reason, psychoanalysis has dealt primarily with neuroses typical for their situation in life by, for
example, focusing more on childhood psychosexual development rather than the psychological
impact of racial discrimination and of economic struggle. It must be noted, however, that Freud
and many of his colleagues were Jewish ethnic minorities suffering persecution from the Nazi
regime in the early 1930’s, which undoubtedly influenced the early works of psychoanalysis and,
some argue, Freud’s general pessimism about human nature (Mitchell & Black, 1995).
Buddhism, on the other hand, arose among the underclass of Indian society. By
emphasizing personal liberation from the rounds of rebirth, it subverted the caste system within
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which there was no upward mobility; each was expected to live up to the expectations of one’s
own caste in order to obtain a more prosperous existence in the next life. Only after being reborn
in the highest caste, that of the Brahmin, could one hope for spiritual liberation. Because
Buddhism held that each individual is capable of liberation regardless of caste, it gained
widespread adoption among the lower castes, many of which consisted of the darker-skinned
races originally inhabiting the southern parts of India and Sri Lanka (de Bary, 1969).
As to the differing definitions of mental health in each of the theories being used, I take
the stance that they are both "right," instead of entertaining the possibility that one may be
"wrong" or "less right" than the other. In other words, the paper assumes that their ideals for
optimal mental functioning are both accurate, and therefore compatible. While this stance is
supported by evidence (Emavardhana & Tori, 1997), it is far from settled (Engler, 1983, 2003).
Strengths and Limitations
Drawing from psychoanalytic traditions that derive from Freud's lineage, there is an
inherent assumption of unconscious processes. This is absent from Buddhist psychology; in this
view, there are no mental processes that are not observable by consciousness. This means that
any unconscious process, such as an ego defense, would be assumed to be accessible to
meditative observation in the Buddhist context. Control-mastery theory comes a bit closer to this
in its assertion that defenses may be lifted by the ego in response to assessments of safety. But
there is still the assumption of this process occurring without the individual's explicit (conscious)
awareness.
On the other hand, by drawing from Abhidhamma and ego psychology, psychoanalytic
and Buddhist thinking are brought closer by taking a structural view of the psyche. This not only
offers a unique approach to the discussion of emptiness, but it also increases the likelihood of
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finding compatibility and complementarity that may enhance our visualization of the human
mind, and enrich our language for describing it.
Whereas Abhidhamma provides a deeply detailed metapsychology with well-defined
components and rules governing mental processes, CMT has a very simplistic metapsychology
consisting of a handful of general concepts, and focuses on the implementation of these concepts
in a therapeutic setting rather than in elaborating the niceties of these ideas in exhaustive detail.
In one sense, this could imply a complementarity in using both of these lenses together.
Alternatively, there is the risk that imposing a more elaborate metapsychology onto CMT
involves a good deal of conjecture and assumption. This poses a weakness inherent in the
approach of this paper of applying these two particular theories together.
As a Buddhist practitioner, my own experiences and beliefs have undoubtedly influenced
my very decision to use Buddhism as one of the theories with which to study emptiness. I have
done my best to keep my enthusiasm for the practice from influencing my application of its
principles to the subject at hand. In this application of these principles, however, my years of
practice and study help to ensure their accuracy and fidelity to acceptable interpretations of
Buddhist teaching.
In a similar vein, my experience as a social worker in a psychotherapy setting has
exclusively involved CMT-based interventions and supervision. This is simultaneously a
weakness and a strength. I may have, in places, applied it with too broad a stroke and glossed
over some subtleties which may be better illuminated through different clinical approaches. On
the other hand, this experience lends at least a modicum of credibility in applying concepts of
CMT to a phenomenon that has not explicitly been dealt with in the CMT literature.
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III. PHENOMENON
“Some may feel that all things become empty, or may see the void nature of the world; others
experience all things as devoid of self-entity, or that both body and mind are non-existent; while
yet others really understand the truth of Sunyata.” – Mahamudra

In this chapter, I discuss emptiness in its broad division between healthy and pathogenic
forms. Each form of emptiness refers to a collection of different types of experience and
psychological states, with some overlapping characteristics. Depending on context, emptiness
commonly refers to many different experiences of the self: an emotion, a symptom, a defense, an
existential state, or a desirable spiritual goal (Peteet, 2011). As a self-experience, it spans several
of these references; it is a gestalt of affective experience and core identifications that comprise a
cognitive schema.
What I mean by cognitive schema or cognitive paradigm is not merely a conceptual
understanding of what one is, but something that is experienced as an existential reality. For
example, those with schizoid personality structure
may experience emptiness as an innate quality that makes them different from other
people; in contrast to others, they cannot feel anything... An internal sense of drifting, of
subjective unreality, and of a soothing quality derived from this very unreality.
(Kernberg, 1975, p. 215)
In this example, experiencing emptiness as an “innate quality” is the cognitive paradigm,
whereas the “internal sense of drifting” and “soothing quality” are some of the affective
components of this self-experience. In contrast, a Buddhist practitioner experiencing sunyata
might "[know] herself as nothing but those feelings," (Epstein, 1995a, p. 126). In this case, the
paradigm is that there is no “experiencer” of the feelings separate from the momentary
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conditions that are giving rise to these feelings. The affective component is a “raw”
experiencing of the feelings as they come and go, without secondary feelings becoming the
predominant experience. “Secondary feelings” refer to reactions, such as anger or anxiety, that
arise due to aversion or attraction to the original experience; for example, becoming frustrated
with oneself for feeling sad.
Emptiness in Western Thought
Emptiness, as it has been known in its various forms to mainstream Western
psychological tradition, is an experience causing subjective distress or psychological
dysfunction; in other words, pathogenic. Pathogenic emptiness involves the experience of some
type of loss. It may be the void felt when something that was experienced to be there is now
missing; or it may be the converse of this—something not existing that ought to—invoked by the
words of Winnicott: “nothing happening when something might profitably have happened,”
(1974, p. 106). Pathogenic emptiness is often expressed in the synonyms of hollowness,
deadness, numbness, nothingness, an inner void, or “something's missing” (Singer, 1977a).
Kernberg (1975) relates an experience of emptiness he shared with a patient:
One patient with strong schizoid features said in one session … that she was unable to
have any feelings... The patient then started to talk about how tiring it was to have to
attend that social event with her cousin and to make an effort to appear involved,
engaged, interested, when in fact she felt miles away and would have loved to simply be
at work, carrying out mechanical tasks without any effort to respond internally... Again, I
discovered that I had become distracted and lost the connections of what she was saying.
At the same time, I was aware of the sun shining into the office, the lines and shadows of
the furniture, and realized with a shock that the patient sitting in front of me seemed an
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almost inanimate object, or, rather, that for me she had at that moment become
impersonal, strange, and mechanical. In other words, she just induced in me the sense of
emptiness and irrelevance that she had described in her interactions with her cousin and
the other people. (pp. 216-217)
In this case, Kernberg discusses the type of emptiness typical of the experience of someone some
level of schizoid character organization. When we speak of emptiness as a symptom of a
disorder or character organization, the quality of the experience of emptiness is closely tied with
the condition it is a symptom of. Epstein (1989) tells us it may at times refer to
…the confusing numbness of the psychotic, the 'despairing incompleteness' of the
personality disorders, the depersonalized state in which one aspect of the self is
repudiated while the observing ego becomes hyperaware, identity diffusion, in which the
self seeps out and fuses with whatever surrounds it, existential meaninglessness. (p. 61)
This statement illustrates the difficulty in describing the experience of emptiness without
referring to the psychodynamics that form the condition we refer to as a disorder. Therefore,
while leaving a more detailed discussion of the theory to the chapters below, I refer to some of
these concepts as I describe the emptiness of these disorders.
Psychopathology and Emptiness
There is a group of four conditions for which emptiness is thought to be a typical
symptom: depression, borderline personality disorder, narcissistic personality disorder, and
schizoid personality disorder (Epstein, 1989; Kernberg, 1975; Levy, 1984; Singer, 1977a,
1977b). The quality and pervasiveness of pathogenic empty self-experience differs for each of
these disorders. Emptiness in depression is excruciating but experienced intermittently. For
those with more severe character pathology, emptiness is a more chronic and fixed self-
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experience (Kernberg, 1975; Singer, 1979). Those who have severe forms of the personality
disorders in this group lack an integrated self, experiencing a disruption of normal relations of
the self with integrated internal objects. How deeply emptiness is experienced by these
individuals is relative to the severity of the disturbance in self-cohesiveness, “not only in
quantity, but in the extent that it encroaches on the entire range of mind and body self
experiences,” (Singer, 1979, p. 491).
Depression. In those with chronic neurotic depressions or depressive personality
structure, the experience of emptiness is intermittent, and in sharp contrast to the rest of their
experience. Emptiness in these cases is seen as related to, but more severe than, loneliness.
Whereas mere loneliness “implies elements of longing and the sense that there are others who
are needed, and whose love is needed, who seem unavailable now” (Kernberg, 1975, p. 214), the
depressive person is under attack by their superego's maintenance of the internal fantasies that
“because of their badness they have destroyed their inner objects and are therefore left alone in a
world now devoid of love” (Kernberg, 1975, p. 215). In other words, the loved object is both
missed and longed for, and there is “an internal void and a feeling of an incapacity for love... the
depressed person comes to feel that they do not deserve to be loved or appreciated” (Epstein,
1989, p. 69).
Borderline personality disorder. Otto Kernberg is widely known for his writings on
borderline and narcissistic personality disorders, and in them has often addressed the borderline
individual's problem with maintaining self-representations. His 1967 paper, Borderline
personality organization, is seen as a pivotal work on the subject, and he is almost invariably
cited by subsequent writers on the subject of borderline experience of emptiness (Singer, 1979;
Epstein, 1989; Jorgensen, 2010; Jennings, 2007; Fuchs 2006). He stressed the central role of the
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defense-mechanism of splitting in borderline experiences of emptiness (Kernberg, 1967, 1975).
Splitting is the defense by which positive and negative aspects of introjections and identifications
are kept apart (Flanagan, 2008). In the individual with borderline personality disorder, splitting
leads to “a psychological structure characterized by the fragmentation rather than integration of
the representations of the self and others that are internalized in the course of development”
(Yeomans, Clarkin, & Kernberg, 2002, p. 8). This fragmentation results in the fluctuations of
self-image and causes a subjective sense of incoherence and discontinuity. Because they are not
integrated, the self-states are mutually dissociated and experienced in isolation from each other.
The individual with borderline character organization abruptly shifts from identification with one
self-state to another, without reference to previous states (Ryle, 1997). This results in a
disruption of the experience of one's self as relatively stable and enduring over time; a
“fragmentation of the narrative self” (Fuchs, 2007). Being fully identified with each successive
state, as one state supplants another, the emptiness in this case is the experience of radical
discontinuity in one's life, of incoherence or inauthenticity—of not being who one “really is.”
On the level of object relations, one is successively identifying with split off, mutually
dissociated self images manifesting in “nonreflective, contradictory, and chaotic descriptions of
self and others, and in the striking inability to become aware of these contradictions” (Clarkin, et
al., 2007). Beneath this tenuous, fluctuating grasp on a sense of selfhood lies the terror of
descending into an even more “regressed” level of emptiness involving the total loss of any self
experience (Singer, 1979, p. 490). This terror is captured in the words of one client, who
indicates that it is worse than the fear of biological death:
It felt like I was going to fall apart and disintegrate into nothing. I would dissociate
while driving and run red lights. I could have died on many occasions because I
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accidentally ran a red light in a dissociative state of mind. I never was suicidal, but
I resented being alive and wanted to be dead. (Kreger, 2011, para. 2)
Narcissistic personality disorder. Of the four conditions being discussed presently,
emptiness is the most prevalent and pervasive in those narcissistic personality structures
(Kernberg, 1982). Emptiness in the individuals with this condition is a result of the poverty of
their internalized object relations that comes from constant devaluation of others (Kernberg,
1982), and the fusion of their ideal ego with what Kernberg calls a pathological grandiose self.
Their diminished capacity for empathizing in depth with others makes it difficult for them to
experience wholeness through intimacy. Instead, it is through being “filled up” with admiration
and respect for being a superior person (Kreger, 2011) that drives them to organize their social
life around “opportunities to obtain confirmation in reality or fantasy of their needs to be
admired, and offers them direct instinctual gratifications, [providing] them with an immediate
sense of meaningfulness” (Kernberg, 1975, p. 218). This attitude often invokes the opposite
response from others, and the narcissist becomes deflated and empty. Kernberg (1975)
continues:
When such gratifications are not forthcoming, their sense of emptiness,
restlessness, and boredom take over. Now their world becomes a prison from
which only new excitement, admiration, or experiences implying control, triumph
or incorporation of supplies are an escape (p. 218).
In other words, if one were “full of oneself,” one is now “empty of oneself.” This emptiness is
expressed as a flat boredom and restlessness. This boredom is a product of the lack of a sense of
connection with the world or others through meaningful relationships. One individual describes
her own experience with this as follows:
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No faith, no love coming in to me, nothing to believe in, work towards, or even be
excited about or look forward to. I am surrounded by things I can't have, as well as
people I can't have, and can no longer take them. (Kreger, 2011, para. 6)
The restlessness is driven by the constant need for affirmation from the outside world of their
gravely distorted self-images. This inevitably results in disappointment given their unrealistic
nature, and those disappointments ignite an even more vigorous effort for affirmation becoming
a vicious cycle.
Schizoid personality disorder. Emptiness in one with schizoid traits has been touched
on above. In these individuals, the splitting process may lead to “a defensive dispersal and
fragmentation of affects as well as of internal and external relationships involving the self and
significant objects, present strong feelings of emptiness” (Kernberg, 1975, p. 220). Clark (1996)
identifies four components of the schizoid person's inner world:
(1) the conviction that loving or needing people leads to control and the loss of
autonomy; (2) the conviction that attempts at psychological separation lead to
vulnerability and destruction of the self owing to the individual's inability to take
care of himself/herself; (3) the conviction that the subsequent reluctance to
experience both states, leading to the vacillation between them, both feels bad in
and of itself and is disapproved of others; (4) the conviction that empty, seeming
unconflicted, undemanding behaviors both feel good and are approved of by
others. (p. 155)
The schizoid stance is a defense against longing for “emotional supplies from a good object”
(Stewart, 1985) on the one hand, as receiving those threatens the individual with being
“swallowed” or consumed by the other, and on the other hand against the threat of consuming or
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destroying the other with their own feelings of love. In Clark's (1996) words, “schizoid people
believe that their feelings of love destroy the other and/or lead to their own destruction” (p. 153).
In each of the four types of pathology discussed above, emptiness is a painful,
frightening, and destabilizing experience. We now turn to emptiness in Buddhism, known as
sunyata, which, rather than the hollowness and disintegration felt in pathogenic emptiness, is an
experience of wholeness, connectedness, and authenticity.
Emptiness in Buddhist Thought
In contrast to Western psychological thought, Buddhism formulates emptiness (as
sunyata) primarily as a vehicle for mental health. Additionally, there are other forms of
emptiness that may also be thought of as healthy or non-pathogenic emptiness besides sunyata.
Like pathogenic emptiness, all of these may also involve the experience of loss since it involves
an abandoning of what for most is the conventional way of experiencing oneself. However, it is
often an experience of loss and gain together; a loss without lacking or the feeling that something
is “missing.” It is better seen as a shift in perspective in which what was thought to exist
absolutely is now perceived as existing in a relative sense, as part of something else or as a
process emerging from interdependent conditions. Paradoxically, it leads to a sense of
wholeness instead of hollowness, of being fully alive rather than “dead inside.”
Many examples of non-pathogenic emptiness are associated with some form of spiritual
tradition or practice. One such example is the mystical union sought by followers of Advaita
Vedanta (Hinduism) whereupon the personal self or psyche is dissolved into the greater Self of
the universe (Brahman). Others may experience the emptiness of the universal principle as a
Cosmic Void (Grof, 1998) and through the dissolution of ego boundaries, experience a merger
with it. Grof (1998) also refers to this as the “pregnant Void” because of its creative potential
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and the simultaneous subjective experience of emptiness and wholeness. Although these
experiences may be beneficial or at least experienced as such—increasing a sense of
understanding and relatedness to the world—within the frame of Buddhist psychology these
types of emptiness are not the same as sunyata would still be considered, at best, distractions
from the ultimate Buddhist aim of liberation from suffering. This is because in these cases,
emptiness is still experienced as independently existing, having an enduring substance as either
something or nothing. According to Buddhism, grasping upon a sense of substantial nature of
any kind is a root cause of suffering. Therefore, experiencing emptiness as a “thing,” whether it
is the dissolution into Brahma of Advaita, the Cosmic Void, or nihilistic nothingness as the
antithesis of being, fundamentally misses the mark even if the individual can be said to have
benefited from such experience. These are examples of pathogenic emptiness found in Buddhist
thought.
The lack of “thingness”—as neither something nor nothing—makes sunyata difficult to
describe. In the Buddhist view, there is a sense that pathological states of self-experience are a
product of narcissistic craving for either existence or nonexistence; the image of the self is clung
to as either something or nothing. These are
the two poles of the false self: namely, the grandiose self developed in compliance with
the parents’ demands and in constant need of admiration, and the empty self, alone and
impoverished, alienated and insecure, aware only of the love that was never given.
(Epstein, 1995a, p. 64)
There is a powerful tendency in human beings to impute absolute meaning or to impute none.
Sunyata is a “middle way” (madhyamaka) that neither reifies nor denies the self, protecting from
the extremes “of left and right (of grandiosity or despair), and when we are in danger of being
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overtaken by our own reactions to things, we can suddenly catch ourselves,” (Epstein, 1995a,
p.100). Apropos of this description, one Buddhist practitioner shared his experience of
emptiness while struggling with a visceral encounter with the polarity of existence and
nonexistence, a diagnosis of cancer:
My own reactions have sunk further into a kind of stillness or darkness, as if a wind is
blowing out of the depths. I was driving along looking for a vacuum cleaner store. I
noticed a guy tailgating me and then stopped noticing him. I slowed, found the store,
turned, and parked. Then a man drove up toward me in a Subaru. He and his dog were
both looking at me. I turned the ignition back on and wound down the window. He
yelled at me for driving like an old lady and some other stranger beings. He had driven
round the block to do this. I didn’t go through the operation I sometimes do of explaining
him to myself. I felt happy and simple, as if honey had been poured over me. “Thank
you,” I said, smiling radiantly. “Thank you.” He paused. He rolled up his window and
drove away. (Tarrant, 2007, p. 212)
This vignette illustrates a number of features of this type of emptiness. The author describes a
completely different sense of agency, of his actions “blowing out from the depths.” This invokes
a sense of effortlessness, his actions flowing forth with neither obstruction nor undue effort from
his ego. His interaction with the irate driver demonstrates a fearlessness of being destroyed or
controlled by someone else's feelings, indicating that this situation would normally require him
to explain this man to himself (in psychodynamic terms, use the defense of rationalization) to
stave off his anxiety. And he is able still to demonstrate warmth and kindness to the man (albeit
in a rather abrupt way). All of this is the opposite of the case of the schizoid, whose emptiness is
driven by fears of being controlled, consumed, and consuming or destroying the other.
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In all four psychopathologies described above, including schizoid personality disorder,
emptiness is a symptom of ego dysfunction. By contrast, sunyata in Buddhism is a quality to be
cultivated, and this process—meditation—assumes a relatively intact ego and structured sense of
self to start with (Engler, 2003). Ego is defined here as “a collective term designating regulatory
and integrative functions,” (Engler, 2003, p. 36). Sunyata is not to be confused with the concept
of “transcending the ego” popular in some variations of new age thinking and most transpersonal
theories. The ego remains intact and essential and is in fact strengthened in meditative practice
(Epstein, 1989; Epstein, 1990a, 1990b). Instead, the cultivation of the experience of sunyata
destroys “the idea of a persisting individual nature,” (Guenther, 1974, p. 207) referring to the
unconscious propensity to view oneself as concrete and “inherently existing” independent being.
Through the acceptance of the self's constructed nature, the self-referential parts of the ego are
altered to embrace a more complete picture of the transiency and relativity of self-identifications:
Although [the self] can be deceptive because it is not exactly what it appears to be, it is
nevertheless efficacious, valuable, and not at all problematic for one who recognizes its
exclusively pragmatic nature. (Huntington, 1989, p. 56)
The self is not annihilated; the self is seen to exist “in the sense that this particular
configuration that is 'me' has a momentary reality of its own in the ongoing flux of change and
transformation” (Engler, 2003, p. 76). It is not disavowed through dissociation, numbness or
unreality; it is not the “emptiness” of being nothing, dead, gone, or missing. Instead, those who
experience sunyata describe feeling just the opposite: more alive, more real, more present; “the
absence of grasping for that essential core that unleashes the flood of affect that makes us feel
most real" (Epstein, 1995a, p. 72). Sunyata is the relinquishing of a fixed image of the self as
either something or nothing. Experiencing emptiness as something “real in itself” or a “vacuity
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of nothingness” (Epstein, 1989, p. 64) is another form of pathogenic emptiness within the
Buddhist frame. Quoting Nagarjuna, the founder of one of the most influential forms of
Mahayana Buddhism, “Emptiness has been said... to be the relinquishment of view, but... those
who hold to the view of emptiness are incurable” (Cleary, 1986, p.19). And despite the
philosophical implications of sunyata, it is not cultivated with the intention to decide a
philosophical or metaphysical issue about reality, but to “liberate oneself from what today we
would call pathogenic beliefs or dysfunctional cognitions” (Engler, 2003, p. 88). The result is a
healthier and more flexible self-experience. The cultivation of sunyata through years of practice
eventually molds the perceptual frame and gradually becomes a habitual mode of functioning.
Conclusion
Emptiness as a phenomenon exists as part of the inner experience of a person. It can be
described in terms of one's affective or sensory experience, as “the confusing numbness of the
psychotic, the 'despairing incompleteness' of the personality disorders” (Epstein, 1989, p. 61) as
well as various feelings of warm contentment, joy, and bliss experienced by Buddhist
practitioners. But emptiness in terms of self-experience cannot be understood solely from this
perspective. It is also an integral part of a person's cognitive and perceptual framework, both
conscious and unconscious, that informs and influences almost every aspect of one's mental life
(Kernberg, 1975). Being inextricable from a person's psychology, one may attempt to
understand emptiness as one does other aspects of one's psychology by framing it within
conceptual frameworks. By applying ego psychology and control-mastery theory on one hand,
and Buddhist psychology and Abhidhamma on the other, a more complete understanding of
emptiness may be developed and the role it plays in mental health and illness.
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IV. BUDDHIST PSYCHOLOGY
The purpose of this chapter is to describe Buddhist psychology according to
Abhidhamma, a collection of texts that make up a part of the canon of classical Buddhism (called
Theravada Buddhism). This psychology presents a view of the mind as constantly in flux, its
components impermanent and interdependent. The theoretical constructs and assertions made
about the mind are the product of direct observation of moment-to-moment consciousness
through the practice of meditation (Bodhi, 2000; Olendzki, 2008; Thera, 1998). Through close
scrutiny, what appears to be the uninterrupted flow of continuous lived experience is revealed to
be “a series of discreet sensory and mental events that arise and pass away in rapid succession,
while the sense of continuity and narrative coherence is something supplied by higher level
imaginative capabilities” (Olendzki, 2011, p. 56). It is to this microscopic level of experience
that the theoretical constructs of the Abhidhamma are applied. In this chapter, I describe these
constructs in detail so that I may use them to create a picture of emptiness from a Buddhist
perspective. Since meditation is of essential importance to classical (and most other forms) of
Buddhism, I also discuss its influence on consciousness as represented by these constructs.
History
Buddhism began in what's now northeastern India around the 5th century B.C.E. This
was a time of rapid material and intellectual development, and the shift from a rural society
based in agriculture to an urban one based on a market economy (cf. de Bary, 1969). The
pervasive, mainstream religious views during this period were based on the Upanishadic
tradition for which the caste system was of central importance as a reflection of a greater cosmic
order. But this time of development and transition was also reflected in the emergence of several
heterodox traditions, many which appealed to those disenfranchised by these modern
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developments: the lower castes and those who relied on agriculture for their livelihood. The two
most prominent of these to survive are Jainism and Buddhism.
Buddhism shares some common ideas with Upanishadic philosophy. Primary among
these is the idea that individuals are subject to endless rounds of birth, death, and rebirth, and that
kamma1 is the moral causative force governing the nature of one's rebirth. Both also hold as the
supreme goal of spiritual life the liberation from this endless cycle. But as to the method and
nature of that liberation, and the nature of the person who is to be liberated, the traditions differ
distinctly.
According to Upanishadic philosophy, atman, the essence or soul of a person, is the
transcendental “true self” of all beings. It is a singular collective Soul underlying and unifying
all people and phenomena (Sharma, 1972). Atman, the “true self,” is covered up by a “false self”
that is individual consciousness and personality. A metaphor often used is that individual
existence is a wave and the atman is the ocean—the wave's individual existence is illusory as it
is not truly separate from the ocean. Failure to recognize and unify with this universal essence is
what leads to endless rounds of birth, death, and rebirth into the various castes in the phenomenal
world. The particular caste one inherits is based on the ethical conduct in previous lives, and
ethical conduct was thought of in terms of performing the duties appropriate to the person's
(current) caste. When one is finally reborn into the highest order, that of a brahmin, one may
dedicate oneself to attaining the highest spiritual knowledge, and ultimately liberation (de Bary,
1969; Sharma, 1972).
Likewise, Buddhism accepts that a distinct, individual self is illusory. However, it rejects
the belief in atman as an immutable, transcendental self to be realized or unified with (Safran,

1

Sanskrit: karma
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2003). To return to the ocean metaphor, according to Buddhism the ocean is as illusory as the
wave. Accordingly, the system of liberation described above—obtaining better rebirths by
performing one's caste-defined duties—is seen as perpetuating the rounds of rebirth rather than
leading to liberation. Instead, it is through recognition of the impermanence of reality and letting
go of self-centered craving that leads to liberation. Whereas the Upanishadic view was to merge
or relinquish the embodied “false self” into the universal “true self,” Buddhism holds that no self
exists separate from the aggregates of form and psychological experience (cf. Olendzki, 2011, p.
68). Therefore, there is no view in Buddhism of an eternal true self that is at odds with a
mundane self that is subject to the pains and fluxes of everyday life. What the Upanishads view
as the mundane self, transient and fluctuating, is indeed all there is. The goal of Buddhism is
therefore not the transcendence of worldly experience, but finding a better way of living in it
(Safran, 2003).
Buddhist psychology is founded upon this understanding of the self. It is based not only
on philosophical underpinnings, but also direct observation through meditation (Bodhi 2000;
Olendzki, 2008, 2011; Thera, 1998). By combining deep concentration with insight practices,
the Buddhist practitioner comes to experience their mental existence as the arising and passing of
various mental and physical phenomena in each subsequent, infinitesimal moment; much like a
film creates the illusion of seamless movement through the rapid succession of static images.
Key Concepts
It is this type of observation that has been systematized in Abhidhamma—the “higher
teaching” of the Theravadin Buddhist canon. It contains a deliberate and highly methodical
systematization of the phenomenology of consciousness and the interplay between consciousness
and the material world. In it, the “static images” referred to in the analogy above, are called
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cittas, translated as “mind-moment”. These, in turn, consist of a grouping of psychological
components referred to as cetasika, “mental factors”. The rapid succession of these mindmoments are themselves grouped into a larger unit of a moment of cognition, or cognitive
process, where a physical or mental object is sensed, observed, recognized, and cognized.
Together these units, with their mutual influence and interdependence, comprise the flow of
consciousness that includes mental illness, wellness, and everything between (Bodhi, 2000;
Olendzki, 2011).
Since the duration of a mind-moment is said to be so small that “in the time it takes for
lightening to flash or the eyes to blink, billions of mind-moments can elapse,” it is difficult to
compare to the categories in Western psychology (Bodhi, 2000, p. 156). This level of analysis is
much finer, whereas categories of the latter apply to referents with much longer duration
(Goleman, 1976). Even so, the two models are not at odds, and may even be complementary.
For example, when repetitive patterns of mind-moments occur with enough consistency over
time so as to adopt some level of apparent stability, there emerges those observable categories
that may include symptoms, syndromes, or even those more enduring traits of personality and
personality disturbances. With this in mind, I turn to more detailed descriptions of these basic
concepts of Abhidhamma.
Mind-moments and mental factors. Mind-moments are the most microscopic slice of
experience dealt with in Abhidhamma (Olendzki, 2008; Thera, 1998). All of our experience can
be broken down into a succession of mind-moments, whose particular qualities determine the
nature of that experience. They are divided into two broad categories of mundane mindmoments—those moments comprising our everyday consciousness—and supramundane—which
refers to those mind-moments that comprise the consciousness of one who is on the path to
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awakening (liberation from suffering). The majority of mind-moments (81 of 89) fall into the
former category, and it includes states of deep meditative absorption, including very advanced
stages of such. The supramundane states (8 of 89) consist of “path” and “fruit” cittas each of
stream-enterer, once-returner, non-returner, and arahant or “worthy one” (Bodhi, 2000). The
roles of these mind-moments, and the method of their attainment, are discussed in greater detail
below.
Awareness according to Abhidhamma always has an object. In other words, awareness
always arises interdependently with a stimulus for that awareness. Where there is no stimulus,
there is no consciousness (A. Olendzki, personal communication, January 19, 2010). To put it
colloquially, one never simply thinks without thinking about something.
Consciousness is what happens when an organism encounters an environment. If an eye
is struck by light reflected off a colored shape, then visual consciousness occurs. But as
soon as the object passes out of the field of vision or one shuts one's eyes, that
consciousness ceases. This is true of every kind of consciousness. “Just as fire,” Gotama
explained to Sati, “is reckoned by the particular condition dependent on which it burns—
a log fire, a dung fire and so on—so too, consciousness is reckoned by the particular
condition on which it arises.” Consciousness is an emergent, contingent, and
impermanent phenomenon. It has no magical capacity to break free from the field of
events out of which it springs. (Batchelor, 2011, p. 180)
The object of consciousness can be external and perceived through the “five doors” of
perception, or an internal object where products of the mind—affects, previous cognitions, prior
cittas—are perceived through the “mind-door.” This is an example of the fundamental Buddhist
notion of interdependence: seeing arises in dependence on a sense organ, an object with visual
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properties, and a mind in which the visual representation is created. If any one of these is absent,
the mind-moment related to seeing does cannot occur. This relationship becomes apparent when
we examine the constituents of a single mind-moment: the mental factors.
A mind-moment is composed of cetasikas or mental factors. They represent the various
qualities of that mind-moment. They should not be thought of as fundamentally existent,
indivisible “psychic atoms” that make up consciousness. Instead, they are phenomenological
units that are simply not reducible by further analysis to any substantial bearers of qualities
(Thera, 1998). There is a group of mental factors that appear in every mind-moment, called the
“universals,” and together they illustrate the interdependent nature of the various faculties that
arise in a single mind-moment. The universal mental factors are as follows:
1. Contact—The factor by which consciousness “touches” the object, initiating the entire
cognitive event.
2. Feeling—The bare affective quality in which the object is experienced. Rather than
complex emotions, this refers simply to the quality of being pleasant or painful to varying
intensities, or neutral.
3. Perception—Apprehension of the qualities of an object.
4. Volition—Organizes the associated mental factors in acting upon the object.
5. One-pointedness—The “unification” of the mind on its object.
6. (Mental) Life faculty—Vitalizes the associated mental states.
7. Attention—Responsible for advertence of the mind to the object, by virtue of which the
object is made present to consciousness. (Bodhi, 2000).
Although the universal mental factors are present in every mind-moment, the relative
strength of a particular mental factor depends on the particular mind-moment in which it arises,
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or on the phase within the cognitive process in which the mind-moment occurs (Olendzki, 2011).
This is true about any two mind-moments that would otherwise seem identical: depending on the
context, there could be great variation in the strength or prominence of individual factors. Three
examples come to mind. In the determining phase of a cognitive process the universal factor of
perception comes to prominence in any mind-moment that occurs. In the javana phase,
however, it is volition that comes to prominence (Bodhi, 2000). Perhaps the most important
example is the universal factor of one-pointedness. This cetasika is the essential ingredient for
meditative achievement—in the mind-moments of deep, meditative absorption it comes to
utmost prominence and is referred to as a “jhana factor.” However, its weaker presence is in
every mind-moment of consciousness, demonstrating “that the germ of that capacity for mental
unification is present in all types of consciousness, even the most rudimentary” (Bodhi, 2000, p.
80). Therefore, meditation involves at least in part the active cultivation of these cognitive states
marked by the progressive strengthening of this mental factor.
Kamma (karma). Mind-moments may also have an ethical quality of being either
wholesome or unwholesome, though some may also be neutral. This is a psychological context
for the workings of kamma, the Pali word for the more familiar Sanskrit term karma. Just as
kamma has implications on rebirth from one life to another, it is also seen as a force influencing
and connecting one’s various mental states over time in one’s present life.
The word kamma literally translates to “deed” or “action.” In Buddhism it denotes the
law of ethical causality—actions are inextricably linked to a reaction or consequence (Thera,
1998). The ethical component is in whether the action is rooted in one of the three unwholesome
roots. These are often coarsely translated as greed, hatred, and delusion (Bodhi, 2005), but the
meanings of “greed” and “hatred” are more aptly translated as desire or clinging for greed and
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aversion for hatred (Epstein, 2007). Delusion (Pali: moha) also carries the sense of
“bewilderment.” The exact opposite of these terms comprise the “wholesome roots.” Actions
rooted in any of these roots have the effect of increasing or decreasing suffering for oneself or
others (Harvey, 2000). Although most translations of Abhidhamma render the positive and
negative types of kamma as “wholesome” or “unwholesome” (Bodhi, 2000), they may also be
rendered as “healthy” or “unhealthy” in the context of psychology (Goleman, 1976).
When a person is actively adapting (consciously or unconsciously) to the object of a
mind-moment, there is the potential for producing kamma. The attempts may be adaptive,
resulting in decreased suffering, or maladaptive, increasing it. The kamma produced by these
actions influence future mind-moments (called resultant mind-moments), which become
wholesome or unwholesome depending on the kamma of the originating mind-moments (Bodhi,
2000) These are often referred to as the “fruit” of kamma (Bodhi, 2005, p. 161).
The cognitive process. Mind-moments occur in a fixed sequence that comprises a single
moment of cognition, referred to as cittavitthi or “cognitive process.” Since consciousness
requires an object of perception to exist, cognitive processes are categorized by the type of object
in question. The first type of cognitive process is the product of sensory stimulus, perceived
through one of the “five-doors” corresponding to the five senses. The second is a product of the
mind and perceived through the “mind-door.”
The five-door process arises in response to external (material) stimulus experienced as
sight, sound, taste, touch, or scent. It consists of 14 mind-moments arising with the sense object:
(1) adverting, (2) sensing, (3) receiving, (4) investigating, (5) determining, (6-12) javanas, (1314) registration (Bodhi, 2000).
The mind-door process takes as its object the products of the mind itself, for example
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memories, feelings, or any other psychic event. It consists of 10 of the 14 mind-moments in the
five-door process; the four that are absent this case are only involved with processing sensation:
(1) adverting, (2-8) javanas, (9-10) registration (Bodhi, 2000).
The first mind-moment to arise in either process is adverting. This mind-moment
“bends” the consciousness toward the stimulus. The next few mind-moments differ between the
two types. Whereas the mind-door process proceeds directly to the series of javana mindmoments, the five-door process has four additional mind-moments before the javanas begin.
These are sensing, receiving, investigating, and determining. Sensing refers to the raw sensory
input that is experienced. Receiving is the stage where this data is assembled into coherence as
an object, while investigating cognizes the object's qualities.
Determining is the process through which the object is identified or recognized and
attached to concepts (even if it is recognized as “unknown”). In actuality, this is precisely the
same mind-moment that is called adverting in the mind-door process (Bodhi, 2000). This
somewhat confusing nomenclature actually illustrates the process through which the sense object
becomes a mental object after it has been “investigated”; it is essentially a second adverting
process adverting this time to the mental representation of the external stimulus that was
originally adverted to (Olendzki, personal communication, January 20, 2010).
The seven javanas are identical mind-moments in terms of their qualities and the mental
factors that comprise them, except that each subsequent javana increases in intensity (Bodhi,
2000). It is within the javanas that the individual take adaptive measures to the object, with the
possibility of generating kamma.
If the impact of the object is great enough, the javana states are followed by two
registration mind-moments. This phase of the cognitive process is reminiscent of the
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psychodynamic process of internalization. After the object has been discerned, interpreted, and
acted upon (adapted to) in the javana processes, a mental representation is formed (Aylward,
2007).
Whereas the javana process is the place where an individual may generate kamma the
receiving, investigation, and registration processes may consist of resultant mind-moments: the
“fruit” of past kamma. This is highly significant. That receiving and investigation mindmoments are influenced by the fruition of kamma illustrates how actions of the past may
influence one’s perception in the present. The two registration mind-moments are also resultant
mind-moments (Bodhi, 2000), implying that the process of internalizing objects is also subject to
influence from the kamma of past thoughts and actions.
Pathology
The focus of Buddhist practice is not to apply a blunt instrument in treating those larger
patterns of behavior described in Western psychotherapy as disorders or mental illness. Rather,
it applies the very fine instrument of moment-to-moment awareness in gaining control over our
mental processes in those moments, the javanas, where there is opportunity to intervene
(Epstein, 1995a). Pathology in Buddhist psychology is therefore attributable to cognitive
processes consisting of mind-moments that are maladaptive (unwholesome kamma). Yet there is
a sense in which even healthy, wholesome, consciousness is still considered maladaptive insofar
as it still occurs within the spheres of the mundane. It is perhaps due to this that only half of
sense-sphere wholesome mind-moments are accompanied by the feeling of joy, and half of those
are dissociated from knowledge, lacking insight into the true nature of the object of
consciousness (Bodhi, 2000). If the goal of Buddhist practice were to merely cultivate the
wholesome states of consciousness, this would be comparable to Freud's notion that the goal of

43

psychotherapy is to transform "hysterical misery into common unhappiness" (Breuer & Freud,
2000, p. 305). In fact, in Buddhism even joyful states are seen as subject to the “three marks” of
existence which are impermanence, suffering, and non-self. These states are temporary, they are
not “me” in any abiding way, and through their passing cause suffering. For this reason, I have
been referring to the action of kamma as increasing or decreasing suffering, rather than
eliminating it.
How does suffering, or pathology, relate to emptiness in Buddhist thought? Attachment
to a fixed image of the self is thought to be at the root of suffering. The three marks of
existence—suffering, impermanence, and non-self—directly point to the relationship between
suffering and attachment to a self perceived as permanent, solid, and “mine.” But Buddhism
elaborates further in that attachment to a self perceived as empty, where emptiness is felt to be
something real as if existing in space and time, is also a source of suffering (Epstein, 1989). This
is clearly observable in clinical expressions of emptiness, for example, in those disorders
mentioned in the previous chapter. In those cases, an individual experiences herself as nothing,
as incomplete, fractured, or missing “pieces” of herself. That pathogenic emptiness is explicitly
addressed in Buddhist writing affirms that both of these theories, one steeped in Western culture
and the other from the East, identify a very real and problematic self-experience. The main
difference lies in where Western psychotherapy advocates an escape to the opposite pole—of
affirming a solid and cohesive sense of self—Buddhism advocates a “middle path” experience of
sunyata, that advocates a viewing both existence and non-existence with skepticism; in other
words, the emptiness of emptiness itself (Huntington, 1989). Without this experience one
continues to suffer from painful self-related experiences like narcissistic injury or humiliation
(Epstein, 1998).
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Whereas Freud seemed resigned to the notion that the best outcome of psychotherapy is
“common unhappiness,” Buddhism holds that the total emancipation from suffering—nibbana—
should be the ultimate goal and that this should be reachable. For this, there is another class of
mind-moments called supramundane, and these are grouped into path and fruition
consciousness, referring to mind-moments that advance one forward through the successive
stages of stream-enterer, once-returner, non-returner, and arahant, and the fruition of that
progress which are the resultant states (Bodhi, 2005). Unlike mundane mind-moments, where
even very high meditative states may be followed by unwholesome ones, once a person has
“changed lineage” (Bodhi, 2000, p.345) to the supramundane, that person moves inexorably
forward to awakening. The key to these achievements lies in the Buddhist practice of
meditation.
Meditation
The meditative practice of classical Buddhism consists of two complementary aspects.
These are samatha (calm or concentration) and vipassana (insight) (Buddhaghosa, 1976;
Olendzki, 2008). Samatha is a concentration practice that involves placing sustained attention
on a particular object. This has the effect of bringing one's attention to the present moment
without distraction by thoughts or other stimulus, and facilitates progression into deeper levels of
meditative absorption, called jhanas. As meditation is developed, these absorptions may be
sustained for successively longer periods of time by the practitioner (Aylward, 2007; Olendzki,
2011), hence the idea of achieving a lasting quality or change implied by the word jhana,
meaning, literally, “limb.”
The practice of samatha involves focusing on a single object as one's concentration
intensifies, taking the practitioner through the successive levels of jhana. When the breath is
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taken as the object of focus in samatha, this practice is what is often referred to in the West as
“mindfulness meditation,” (Epstein 1995a) and may also go by the term anapanasati in Buddhist
scripture. The mental factor of one-pointedness is the essential quality that is being refined
(Olendzki, 2011). The 4 or 5 jhanas are considered essential aspects of the supramundane mindmoments. However, they also occur in mundane mind-moments such as the so-called “finematerial” and “immaterial” spheres. This illustrates that samatha meditation is a necessary, but
not sufficient, condition for awakening (Olendzki, 2008). The supramundane states may only be
reached by combining samatha practice with vipassana (Aylward, 2007; Olendzki, 2008;
Olendzki 2011).
Vipassana translates as “insight” and refers to the practice of contemplation of experience
providing insight into sunyata defined by the “three marks” mentioned above—suffering,
impermanence, and non-self. The Abhidhamma and Buddhaghosa’s important treatise, the
Visuddhimagga, describe the process in detail as a series of seven “purifications” that, taken in
sequence, lead one into the supramundane paths. Of these, the second one is purification of
mind and refers to access or absorption meditation—samatha. It is only between the sixth and
the seventh purifications that the “change of lineage” occurs whereby one has achieved the level
of “stream-entry.” The aspect of insight is represented by the mental factor of wisdom.
Wisdom, understood as seeing things as they really are, is the crucial transformative
principle in the Buddhist tradition. Just as you can practice meditation without
manifesting mindfulness, so also you can practice mindfulness all you want, but if it is
not conjoined with insight (another word for wisdom) it will not in itself bring about a
significant change in your understanding. Real transformation comes from uprooting the
deeply embedded reflex of projecting ownership upon experience (“this is me, this is
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mine, this is what I am”) and seeing it instead as an impermanent, impersonal,
interdependent arising of phenomena. (Olendzki, 2008, Cultivation of Mindfulness
section, para. 5)
When this is developed along the path of purification, upon entering supramundane
mind-moments, elements of the eightfold path pertaining to ethical conduct manifest as mental
factors; namely, Right Speech, Right Action, Right Livelihood (Buddhaghosa, 1976). It may
appear odd that apparently external volitional activities appear as mental factors in the
supramundane mind-moments. But this signifies the fruits of insight practice; that one has
“internalized” the path to the point where they manifest “automatically” in the consciousness of
one who has progressed to this level (Bodhi, 2000). In other words, it no longer requires effort
to conduct oneself in a wholesome manner. The other elements of the eightfold path that fall
under the categories of mental development and wisdom are already accounted for in the mental
factors that correspond with the jhanas, called jhana factors, and the mental factor of wisdom.
According to Bodhi's (2000) commentary, in one “who has reached the experience of streamentry, the path factors [of the eightfold path] become fixed in destiny, and flow like a stream
leading to Nibbana,” (p. 67).
In the practice of vipassana, one is said to go through several successive stages, called
purifications. Of these, the first refers to ethical conduct, and the concentration practice of
samatha occupies the second purification. However, it is only towards the end of the sixth stage
of purification that the full experience of sunyata is crystallized, and the “idea of a persisting
individual nature” (Epstein, 1989, p. 14) is finally relinquished (Buddhaghosa, 1976; Bodhi,
2000;). This demonstrates that acquiring the skill of samatha practice is not equivalent to
spiritual or psychological awakening in the Buddhist tradition.
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Summary
Buddhist psychology of the Abhidhamma envisions the mind in terms of minute units of
experience. It looks to these units to explain pathology, and its primary therapeutic practice of
meditation, by focusing the mind on the present moment, intervenes at this level. Despite how
this differs from traditional Western ways of thinking about pathology, our familiar diagnostic
categories may also be seen as larger interacting patterns of these mind-moments. Rather than
being at odds with this familiar diagnostic system, it offers a complementary view focusing on
the same phenomena at a different scale. This level of magnification has for centuries been
applied in the context of sunyata. In the present study it is also used to examine the phenomena
of pathogenic emptiness and break them down into the microscopic level, determining what
mind-moments are involved in the experiences and how they are connected and influence each
other to establish a pattern over time that one may recognize as symptom, defense, or personality
trait.
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V. CONTROL-MASTERY THEORY
The purpose of this chapter is to describe control-mastery theory (CMT), a
psychodynamic theory that grew out of contemporary ego psychology. Contemporary ego
psychology is the school of thought that evolved from the initial efforts of Anna Freud and Heinz
Hartmann. It marks a shift in focus from the unconscious instinctual drives, which is the primary
concern of Freud's drive theory, to the executive and synthesizing functions of the ego. As the
theorists continued to focus on the ego, it increasingly revealed itself to be an elaborate structure
with highly nuanced and complex functions that scale well beyond Freud's initial conception of it
as primarily a mediator between the demands of the drives, the superego, and external reality.
Eventually it was observed that the traditional drives of aggression and sexuality could not
account for the full range of human behavior. It was therefore proposed that mastery is also a
primary motivating force driving us to overcome problems in ourselves and in our environment,
and to make sense out of the world. CMT marks a further shift by placing the drive to mastery at
the heart of the psychotherapy process, overshadowing, if not completely eradicating, treatment
based on analyzing the traditional instinctual drives. Furthermore, CMT proposes that
individuals have unconscious control over some of the ego functions of ego psychology,
particularly defenses; they may lift or activate defenses in response to assessments of safety and
danger.
In this section, I provide a brief history of the development of CMT. Then, I describe the
main theoretical constructs of CMT, including pathogenic beliefs, unconscious plans for mastery,
and testing.
History
In 1923, Freud introduced his Structural Model of the psyche in The Ego and the Id. The
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model describes the id, ego, and superego as locked into an ongoing struggle between competing
interests: the id interested only in gratifying infantile wishes, while the superego's sole purpose is
to stop this from happening, with the ego attempting to mediate between each of these aims and
the external world (Freud, 1923). The ego accomplishes this through an unconscious process
called compromise-formation. This compromise allows the id some gratification by channeling
it through a system of defenses. This way the id's impulses are controlled and disguised,
allowing them to escape the gavel of the superego and social censure. It is due to these
compromise-formations that neurotic symptoms emerge, and these symptoms serve as “inherent
punishment” that satisfy the demands of the superego (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 25).
Starting with this structural model, Anna Freud pioneered the beginnings of modern ego
psychology. She focused most of her study to the role of unconscious defenses, and felt it was
part of the analyst's task to bring those unconscious defenses (beyond merely id impulses) to
light. Through her study, she cataloged the various defenses commonly observed, and located
them along a developmental continuum ranging from psychotic, to immature, to neurotic, to
mature (Freud, 1936). The use of more primitive defenses by an adult signals disturbances in
developmentally earlier phases of childhood. Furthermore, Anna Freud noted that the defenses
are not only called into activity in response to internally arising conflict, but may also be
prompted by displeasure with its source in the external world (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 30).
Thanks to her contributions, the focus of analysis shifted away from concentrating mostly on
underlying id impulses to giving equal due to the unconscious processes of the ego and superego
as well. It also expanded the application of psychoanalytic ideas from symptoms to character
style as it relates to the stable, idiosyncratic, repetitive pattern of ego organization (Schamess &
Shilkret, 2008, p. 65).
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Despite this shift in emphasis in the practice of psychoanalysis, the fundamental view
remained of the ego as entrenched in the conflicts between id, superego, and the demands of
reality. It wasn't until Heinz Hartmann (1958) began to study closely the ego's role in adaptation
that many of the ego's functions are autonomous, operating in a “conflict-free sphere.”
According to this view, humans, like other animals, have evolved to adapt to their environment.
As such, humans are born with “built-in ego potentials” flourish in what he called the average
expectable environment—in other words, an environment free from extremes of duress and with
basic supports and nurturing in place (Hartman, 1958). These ego functions concerned with
adaptation are generally uninvolved with and free from the effects of intrapsychic conflict. The
must, therefore, derive their energy, or motivation, from something other than sexuality or
aggression. Hartmann speculated that this energy could be derived through a process of
neutralization – where the ego strips the drives of their sexual and aggressive qualities (Mitchell
& Black, 1995; White, 1959). This is different than the ego defense of sublimation, where id
impulses are redirected into valuable and socially acceptable behaviors while maintaining, in
“subliminal” form, their sexual or aggressive qualities. This way, Hartmann maintained a
connection to Freud's drive theory, keeping ego psychology within the realm of psychoanalysis
while also broadening the theory with a more complex view of the ego that brought it closer to
the field of psychology.
To many, neutralization was an unsatisfactory explanation, and as a more complex vision
of the ego emerged there grew objections to the conception that “so vital and versatile a part of
the personality could be developed solely by libidinal and aggressive energies” (White, 1959, p.
307). A solution was eventually proposed that, rather than through neutralization of the drives,
the energy for autonomous (conflict-free) ego functions is provided by a third primary source:
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the innate drive toward competence. White (1959) made a compelling argument a motivation for
competence that “cannot be wholly derived from sources of energy currently conceptualized as
drives or instincts” (p. 297). He observed that from the time of birth, there appears to be an
innate motivation to undertake actions that are not directly related to need states. A great
number of activities may be classified under this including exploration, play, search for novelty,
and active learning. Moreover, such activities are done more effectively in the absence of strong
motivating influences of the drives (White, 1959, p. 327). This turn in ego psychology
completely freed it from the need to account for ego activity by way of drive theory, though
veering from Freudian orthodoxy.
The final development in ego psychology to be presently discussed builds on this notion
of mastery as a primary motivating force. It is called control-mastery theory (CMT), and, as in
White's (1959) conceptualization of mastery, it maintains the notion that people are intrinsically
motivated to achieve greater degrees of competency; it's the adaptive imperative that predisposes
all animals to adapt to their environment (Silberschatz, 2005). This extends not only to the
external environment and various developmental tasks, but also to overcoming traumas and
conflicts (Schamess & Shilkret, 2008). As part of the task of adaptation, a person establishes
unconscious beliefs about how the world works, especially interpersonal relations. People form,
and test, hypothesis about the world around them in order to establish a reliable conception of
reality: the world, their relationships, and themselves. According to Joseph Weiss, one of the
founders of CMT, psychopathology results when these beliefs are maladaptive, providing an
inaccurate picture of reality. For these he coined the term pathogenic beliefs (Weiss, 1993).
“Control” in CMT refers to the assumption that people are able to exercise unconscious
control over their ego defenses, usually in response to assessments of safety and danger. This
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presents another diverging view from drive theory. On of the goal of the therapist is therefore to
“understand what the patient is afraid of, what the patient is defending against, and to help the
patient feel safe from these dangers” (Rappoport, 2002, p. 1). Creating safety allows the client to
lower the defenses and thereby become more open, relaxed, expressive, and insightful. From
there, the client may begin unconsciously testing pathogenic beliefs with the therapist in an
attempt to form a more reliable model of reality.
Key Concepts
The concepts from control-mastery theory relevant to the present undertaking will now be
described in detail. Concepts from ego psychology are also discussed insofar as they are relevant
to CMT.
Ego functions. The ego itself is generally not seen as consisting of various “parts”, with
or without corresponding biological mechanisms. Similar to the mental factors of Abhidhamma,
the ego functions are interrelated and interdependent, and the ego as a whole is more than a sum
of its parts (Schamess & Shilkret, 2008). In fact, it is precisely the cohesive structure of the ego
that gives rise to the experience of a stable, independently existing self: “When ego successfully
accomplishes its organizing and synthetic functions, individual experiences himself as coherent,
functional human being with an enduring sense of personal identity [emphasis added]”
(Schamess & Shilkret, 2008, p. 65). Even so, discerning its various functions as discrete entities
has proven helpful modeling mental activity, and they are often used in the context of assessment
tools in mental health clinics. The two ego functions of particular significance to CMT are
mastery and ego defenses.
Mastery is the ego function that seeks to achieve competence. Greater levels of ego
organization are achieved as the individual masters successive developmental challenges. As
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discussed above, mastery plays a central role in contemporary ego psychology (through the
thought of Hartmann (Mitchell & Black, 1995) followed by White (1959)) and control-mastery
theory as a primary motivating force alongside the biologically-based sexual and aggressive
drives. Especially in the case of CMT, this function plays a central role in the theory and
practice of psychotherapy, supplanting the importance of drives in classical psychoanalysis. In
CMT, mastery drives the process of psychotherapy, motivating the client to seek more adaptive
ways to understand and interact with the world through testing these beliefs with the therapist.
Understanding ego defenses provides insight into the psychotherapeutic process since
they play a large role in the interaction between client and therapist. As McWilliams (1994)
notes, almost any psychological process may be used defensively, therefore there is no such
thing as an exhaustive list of defenses. The ones listed in her own text are the ones most
commonly referred to in the clinical literature, and are relevant to the discussion of emptiness in
particular, due to their roles in character patterns (McWilliams, 1994, p. 117); since character
patterns are an important part of self-experience, it is logical to assume they influence empty
self-experiences as well. What follows are some examples of defenses relevant to this
discussion, paraphrased from McWilliams (1994) text:


Primitive withdrawal—This type of withdrawal represents entering a different state of
consciousness. It is a psychological escape from reality that can be seen even in infants
who fall asleep in response to being overstimulated or distressed.



Denial—This defense in its most archaic form is a type of magical thinking that holds
that if something painful or unpleasant is not acknowledged, it isn't really happening.
This is typical, and normal, in the egocentric thinking of young children. In adults, this
type of defense can be very dysfunctional, for example when alcoholics deny their
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drinking problem even after great personal losses due to it (loss of a job or important
personal relationships, for example).


Omnipotent control—In an infant's experience of reality, she is in complete control of the
world. This state of primary grandiosity gives way to a “secondary” omnipotence, where
it is believed that the child's primary caregivers are all-powerful. Eventually, as the child
matures, she comes to accept the reality that no one has unlimited power over reality
while ideally maintaining a sense of agency. This may be seen as a defense in an adult
when they interpret experiences as “resulting from their own unfettered power,”
(McWilliams, 1994, p. 104).



Projection and introjection—In these defenses, there is a lack of psychological boundary
between the self and the world. In projection, what is inside is misperceived as coming
from outside. While being a basis for empathy, it may also be pathological when it is a
blatant denial of a person's own deficiency, perceived instead as a deficiency in another.
Introjection is the inverse of the above, and can take the form of benign identification
with significant others, or it can be more problematic such as in the case of “identification
with the aggressor” in victims of severe interpersonal trauma.



Splitting—Splitting is the process of segregating positive from negative, good from bad.
This process, while effective in staving off anxiety, can result in unintegrated objectrepresentations where bad aspects of an object are completely disconnected from good
aspects.

Unconscious pathogenic beliefs. The main focus of CMT is to work with a client's unconscious
pathogenic beliefs, or just pathogenic beliefs, for short. People form unconscious beliefs about
the world, about others, about themselves, and about the relationships between all three. When
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these beliefs provide an inaccurate “map” of reality, the individual to acts in maladaptive ways.
These beliefs are often the result of traumatic childhood experiences and begin as an effort at
adaptation. The traumatizing circumstances of the child's environment, or in Hartmann's (1958)
terms, lacking an average expectable environment, leads one to form beliefs that allow one to
function within that environment. These beliefs, however, are not generalizable outside that
environment with those particular relationships, and therefore maladaptive. Silberschatz (2005)
provides a common example:
Individuals who experience physical or emotional abuse in childhood often develop a
pathogenic belief readily familiar to most therapists, regardless of their theoretical
orientation. The abuse victim typically believes that he or she was “bad” and deserved
the treatment he or she received at the hand of his or her abuser. Like all pathogenic
beliefs, this belief begins as an effort at adaptation. In order to survive, the abused child
needs his parents, even if they are hurting him. Consequently, he would prefer to see
himself as bad or flawed rather than see his parents as being flawed … However, this
irrationally self-blaming belief ultimately leads to psychopathology because a person who
believes (consciously or unconsciously) that he or she is flawed and deserves to be
mistreated frequently becomes involved in abusive or destructive relationships and
suffers from depression, severe anxiety, self-destructive behavior patterns, and/or
personality disorders. (pp. 5-6)
While everyone lives with a number of pathogenic beliefs, people often seek treatment when
these are severe and persistent enough to interfere with normal developmental goals. The
therapeutic environment is one in which the client may (and, as proponents of CMT would
emphasize, will) test their pathogenic beliefs with their therapist. Through testing, the client is
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actually attempting to disconfirm the pathogenic belief, replacing it with a more adaptive one.
This implies that on some level, they are aware that the pathogenic belief is causing them to
suffer, and enter therapy with a plan (often unconscious) to overcome them (Silberschatz, 2005,
p. 8).
Testing. Testing, as the definition of the word implies, is a trial action that is undertaken
in order to assess the results of that action. By testing the therapist, the client is seeking
“corrective emotional experiences” (Alexander & French, 1946)—experiences that will allow the
client to gradually work through early traumas, disconfirming pathogenic beliefs and replacing
them with more adaptive ones. Testing may occur in one of two forms (or sometimes a
combination of both): transference tests, and passive-into-active tests (Weiss, 1996; Weiss &
Sampson, 1983). Transference testing refers to the same phenomenon of transference recognized
by most other schools of psychoanalysis. In it, the client “experiences himself or herself in the
historical role he or she had as child and experiences the therapist as a parent or other significant
authority figure,” (Rappoport, 2002, p. 2). As a method of testing, the client unconsciously
hopes that the therapist will react differently (the opposite) from the way the original person in
the client's life did.
He may hope, for example, that he will not, by his sexuality, provoke the therapist to
punish him, or by his contentment provoke the therapist to charge him with complacency,
or by his independence cause the therapist to feel rejected. (Weiss, 1993, p.14)
In passive-into-active testing, the roles are reversed with the client behaving towards the
therapist in the traumatic ways that the significant other behaved towards them. This mode of
testing is more adversarial; the client assumes the role of the traumatizing parent and attempts to
induce the same distressing emotions in the therapist that the client had experienced as a child.
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Therefore, the therapist may experience a high level of emotional strain. The client hopes the
therapist will respond assertively in the face of this mistreatment, thereby “modeling” this
behavior for the client, who then feels safer to exercise more assertiveness in future interactions.
Conclusion and Summary
Control-mastery theory is a natural framework to apply to the phenomenon of emptiness.
Emptiness involves a cognitive schema that defines how one experiences one’s self. This, in
turn, influences one's way of viewing and being in the world and interacting with others. At least
part of this cognitive schema is unconscious as it comprises the lens through which we view
reality. CMT is directly concerned with this lens when it negatively affects one’s life. It is this
type of schema that is referred to as a pathogenic belief.
CMT has developed from a lineage that gradually refocused the work of psychotherapy
away from the id and its drives and toward the intricate workings of the ego. Along with this
development came a greatly expanded role for the ego function of mastery as a powerful force in
human psychology. As the name implies, mastery is foundational to control-mastery theory as
the entire therapeutic technique derives from the notion that the client is constantly working
towards mastering their problems in and out of the therapy clinic.
The concepts of ego functions and defense mechanisms are some of the greatest
contributions of ego psychology. These provide a helpful assessment tool in clinical situations,
and provides a language with which to discuss the dynamics involved in experiences of
emptiness and in the therapeutic process. The concept of pathogenic beliefs and testing that are
central to control-mastery theory provide a conceptually clear way to model both pathogenic
experiences of emptiness and the way one works to overcome those beliefs. The applicability to
self-experience comes primarily from the observation that pathogenic beliefs predominantly
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manifest as conceptions and definitions about the self. Pathogenic self-experiences may thus be
profitably viewed as resulting from unconscious pathogenic beliefs about the self. Along with
this, the phenomena of testing and mastery (as a primary motivating force) provide useful
parallels to the practice and process of Buddhist meditation in transforming self-experience.
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VI. DISCUSSION
Emptiness is not one single phenomenon. It is a gestalt of affective experiences and core
identifications that are part of a cognitive schema that consciously and unconsciously influences
the way one experiences everyday life. Moreover, the experience of emptiness may range from
deeply disturbing to centering, joyful, and even blissful. Hence there is emptiness that is
detrimental, causing distress and suffering—pathogenic emptiness—and there is emptiness that
is beneficial and leads to adaptive functioning.
The forms of emptiness that have been known to Western clinical practice are
concomitant with psychopathology. The experience of being empty is considered a symptom of
distress, not a sign of health. This is primarily due to its emphasis on individual identity and
object constancy; accordingly, emptiness in its pathogenic form is the converse of these ideals of
mental health. It is a source of intense suffering and often at the very core of psychopathology,
especially in the case of personality disorders. It can be experienced as emotional destitution,
incompleteness, depersonalization or dissociation, or meaninglessness. There are four
mainstream diagnoses that have this type of emptiness as a symptom: depression, borderline
personality disorder, narcissistic personality disorder, and schizoid personality disorder.
On the other hand, Buddhist practice is organized around achieving the experience of
emptiness. Emptiness, sunyata, is integral to one's well-being, so much so that in Buddhism
most, if not all, of psychological suffering is attributed to not having achieved and integrated this
form of self-experience. Rather than an experience of lacking or incompleteness, it is an
experience of wholeness, feeling more alive, more real, more present for having relinquished an
absolutist attachment to self as “either something or nothing” in favor of a relative view of self
which is felt to exist “in the sense that this particular configuration that is 'me' has a momentary
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reality of its own in the ongoing flux of change and transformation” (Engler, 2003, p. 76).
With this understanding of emptiness in mind, as well as our more extensive description
of it in Chapter III, I now discuss the findings that came from applying the two theoretical lenses
described in Chapters IV and V. Applying the coarser lens of control-mastery theory allows me
to frame the phenomenon in terms of pathogenic beliefs and the observable behavior that comes
from them, including testing. Then “zooming in” with the lens of Buddhist psychology
(Abhidhamma) provides insight into the potential inner workings of pathogenic emptiness, which
should simultaneously allow us to compare this with sunyata, which is already a part of this
Buddhist framework. To illustrate and underscore these findings, I apply them to a case vignette
of pathogenic emptiness taken from the literature. Implications relevant for clinical social work
or psychotherapy are highlighted and discussed, as are recommendations for future research.
Case Vignette
To illustrate the discussion of pathogenic emptiness I use a case vignette taken from
Clark’s (1996) article. The example follows the case of a woman, Ellen, who is described by the
author as possessing a schizoid disorder of the self. Ellen was the eldest of two children. Her
father is described as cruel, controlling, narcissistic, physically abusive and sexually seductive.
Her mother was an alcoholic who neglected and ignored Ellen. Despite this, Ellen describes how
at an early age she adored her mother. She recalled “clinging to her physically and crying
because she loved her so much” (Clark, 1996, p. 159). At times when she felt lonely and empty,
she would sit quietly beside her preoccupied mother attempting to receive some comfort from
her physical proximity. Her father forced her to care for her mother when she was drunk, and
generally treated her as a kind of servant. He demanded her companionship at night where she
was expected to sit silently and unobtrusively while he read the newspaper or watched television
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and forbade her to engage in any activity of her own. She survived this by emptying herself of
her own needs and sense of selfhood, becoming a “featureless and emotionless doll” which
resulted in a sense of inner deadness, loneliness, and invisibility (Clark, 1996, p. 159). When
this became unbearable, she would provoke her father into attacking her in order to feel seen.
When those attacks became intolerable, she once again became empty.
In her adult relationships, Ellen continued this pattern of oscillating between empty and
provocative states. This was also noticeable in her presentation in therapy; Ellen’s demeanor
was very detached, wooden, and muted. It would occasionally give way to more provocative
behavior:
…she had so successfully hidden any evidence that she was a living, breathing
person that she resembled a windup doll far more than a woman. However, across
the seemingly perfect emptiness of her demeanor from time to time, tiny glimpses
of aspects of her hidden personality flitted… at times she would appear frightened,
timid, shallow, in a low level dither, and falling all over herself to obey orders. At
other times, just for a moment, she would appear cold, supercilious, aloof,
superior, and vain… with a hint of cruelty and contempt. (Clark, 1996, p. 158)
She had little capacity for intimacy, yet also had difficulty managing alone. To her
therapist she reported no particular interests, activities, or hobbies. Her career as a secretary put
her in a position where she was required to put the needs of others ahead of her own. As for her
family life, she claimed to have no particular liking for her husband, and seemed to have married
him in part due to an accidental pregnancy. Clark (1996) describes Ellen’s relationship to her
children as “alternately intrusive and neglectful, and cruel” (p. 160).
Treatment. Clark (1996) describes how in the initial course of treatment, Ellen “reacted
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to almost anything I said as if it were an order, rushing out of the office to follow it, but in such a
way as resoundingly to sabotage the results” (p. 160). She understood this as a method of
provoking that allowed Ellen to express her anger without owning it, and to be simultaneously
involved and not involved with the therapist. Over time, as the therapist interpreted this to her,
she began to acknowledge how she kept “one foot in and one foot out” of numerous relationships
in her life. Clark (1996) terms this position the “neutral zone” (p. 159).
Leaving this neutral zone through the desire to know and express herself brought up
intense anxiety about being controlled, enslaved, or abused. Ellen likened the experience to
feeling like she is with “Big Brother” and reported feelings of impending disaster if she speaks
up. Clark (1996) observes that Ellen dealt with this anxiety by “pushing onto” her therapist part
of her experience. The author writes:
I was fascinated by the strength of my reactions to this seemingly innocuous person. On
all too many days, simply seeing her in the waiting room elicited in me a powerful urge
to sadistically attack her; alternately, I would feel controlled by her and, in response,
helpless and impotently enraged. (Clark, 1996, p. 161)
Clark (1996) sees this dynamic as the defensive process of projective identification. In
projective identification an unwanted or threatening aspect of the self is projected unto another,
and that person is experienced as having those traits. Additionally, the person who is projected
upon may experience the projected qualities as if they are coming from herself. In Ellen’s case,
the therapist’s role in the projective identification dynamic alternated between being felt to be
sadistic and tyrannical and impotent and helpless.
As Ellen progressed, she became more outspoken about her feelings and needs and this
was seen as a positive sign. She was becoming more independent and autonomous.
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Correspondingly, feelings of abandonment by a bored, indifferent and unresponsive mother came
to the foreground. Clark (1996) notes that at this point she, as her therapist, began to experience
incredible boredom and sleepiness during their sessions, and it was challenging to combat this
and stay awake and present for Ellen. At these times when Ellen was asked how she was feeling,
she responded by saying she felt lonely and alone, as though the therapist was not with her, and
that she felt “terrifyingly” invisible (Clark, 1996, p. 162). This aloneness and invisibility would
prompt her to return to her provocative behaviors. She would then become annoyed and distance
herself from her therapist. After providing some momentary relief, the distancing would cause
her to feel alone and invisible again. With neither closeness nor distance tolerable, she would
once again become empty in the sense of an “emotionless, detached doll” (Clark, 1996, p. 162).
But with her growing awareness of herself, this state provided little solace and she would
earnestly turn to her therapist for help. This would again invoke her fear of being controlled,
thus perpetuating the cycle.
As time went on Ellen gradually began viewing this engagement of projective
identification as a process with roots within herself rather than as a real product of her
relationship with her therapist. Her awareness of her shifting experiences of the therapist
became sharper, and this increased her anxiety with respect to being controlled or ignored by her
therapist. To combat this, she began “regressively idealizing” the therapist (Clark, 1996, p. 164),
just as she had tried to idealize her mother as a child. This developed into an adoring attitude
toward the therapist that became counterproductive; her emotional expression once again became
restricted by becoming “shallow” and her progress in identifying her needs and feelings and
acting on her own behalf was fading. Ellen was deemphasizing herself in relation to the
therapist. After multiple interpretations along this line, Ellen identified her anxiety as stemming
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from the feeling that she was defying her parents by placing herself “in the middle of her own
psychological universe” by being independent and aware of her own needs (Clark, 1996, p. 163).
In Clark’s (1996) words, she became aware of the “basis of her fear of acknowledging the very
existence of a self” (p. 163). Emptiness in the form of effacing or repudiating her self was the
price of belonging in the “sick system” (Clark, 1996, p. 163) of her family of origin.
It began to emerge that emptiness set in during therapy when Ellen experienced shifting,
contrary attitudes, feelings, or impulses. The vacillations produced intense shame, and to avoid
this she became empty—the “hollow doll.” Her parents held negative attitudes about having
contradictory feelings and wishes, and exploring these types of feelings and wishes in therapy
caused her to feel separate from her family and alone. The emptiness of disavowal of her self
was her way of remaining close to her parents. More generally, by receiving the nurturance and
support for the emergence of her separate self in therapy, it became all more painfully evident
that this would never be provided by her own parents. This separation from her internal images
of her parents led to a different type of emptiness that consisted of a despairing loneliness. The
repudiation of her self, as it did when she was a child, allowed her to connect with her parental
images in a way that exchanged this pain for numbness. Ellen came to recognize the importance
of experiencing her shifting, contrary wants and needs as a pathway to separation/individuation,
and her “correct experience of that perception as the doorway to her dawning recognition of the
nature of her real self,” (Clark, 1996, p. 164). Ellen expresses this in her own words:
There are a lot of different feelings in me, and I am beginning to accept it. I am
beginning to enjoy the day, maybe not even a day, maybe a moment when I feel joy,
knowing that there may be utter turmoil in the next moment, because I can accept the
turmoil. Because of this, I feel a bit more spontaneous, more social, more relaxed.

65

(Clark, 1996, p. 165)
Pathogenic Emptiness as Pathogenic Belief
Pathogenic emptiness as we have described in Chapter III involves a cognitive
framework through which a person experiences herself as incomplete or non-existent (Epstein,
1989). To a therapist whose practice is based in CMT this has the traits of a pathogenic belief;
pathogenic beliefs are themselves a cognitive framework or schema (Silberschatz, 2005) that
influence an individual’s perception of the world and her self. Such a therapist would then hope
to eventually reveal the traumatic events from the client’s past that led to such a maladaptation.
The identification of pathogenic emptiness as a pathogenic belief is also supported a
priori by Buddhist psychology. As I have discussed above, in Buddhist thought attachment to
self as either something or nothing is the source of suffering. This comes from the fact that both
of these extremes of self-experience are subject to the three marks of existence—impermanence,
suffering, and no-self. In other words, neither of them are real and therefore attachment to them,
i.e. believing in one or the other, is pathogenic. It follows that experiencing the self as nothing,
incomplete, or missing pieces is based on a pathogenic belief, maladaptive in that it is not an
accurate model of reality. For Buddhism, it exemplifies the attachment to self as nothing. One
can even phrase it in the converse as the attachment to the self as something—an independently
existing whole—the individual could be or achieve (but isn’t or hasn’t).
The one thing that isn’t obviously addressed in this formulation is how such a pathogenic
belief comes to be. For CMT, all pathogenic beliefs are formed at least in part as a response to
traumatic experience. It is evident in the case example of Ellen that traumatic experiences
precipitated pathogenic beliefs about her empty self, and one can see the ways in which these
beliefs influenced her self-experience and behavior.
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Ellen’s childhood was marred by traumatic relationships with her abusive and neglectful
parents. Her experiences of emptiness formed as a result of these early experiences and became
an embedded part of her way of experiencing and relating to the world. Her emptiness manifests
as both a deficiency in the development of her sense of self and an active suppression of a sense
of self. From her narcissistic father and “deserting but desirable” (Guntrip, 1971, p. 28) mother,
she received no nurturance or support for her emerging self as a child. This situation causes a
disruption in the development of self and object representations resulting in “an 'emptying of the
self' with concordant fears of being swallowed, extinguished, imprisoned, absorbed or lost in a
'vacuum of experience'" (Epstein, 1989, p. 63). Ellen’s own poignant description of her
subjective experience echoes this, likening it to “shouting into space, her voice echoing out and
out with never a response to beam it back to her and help her to feel real” (Clark, 1996, p. 162).
This aligns with Singer’s (1977a) deficiency model of emptiness.
Her emptiness was also a defensive suppression of a sense of self, outwardly visible in
the way Ellen related with her therapist. Clark (1996) likens it to an “empty doll, [hiding] any
evidence that she was a living, breathing person,” (p. 158). This denial of her self was also a
consequence of Ellen’s relationship to her parents as a child. Her parents did not tolerate Ellen’s
expressions of her self, and responded in ways that actively suppressed her or neglected and
abandoned her emotionally. Ambivalence was especially frowned upon by her parents, who
expressed “negative attitudes about her contradictory feelings and wishes and their approval of
self-effacing, doll-like behavior,” (Clark, 1996, p. 164). In the case of her father, Ellen was
required to be physically near him, while at the same time unobtrusive and vacant of her own
needs and feelings. Her own agency about whether or not to be there and any expression of
herself risked violent retribution by him. Ties to her father were thus completely on his terms,
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and conditional upon her simultaneous presence (at his whim) and emptiness. As for her mother,
Ellen was essentially invisible to her. She was required to take care of her, for example, when
she was drunk essentially being a mother to her, and not receiving any mothering from her.
Ellen had to be selfless, in both the colloquial sense of the term and in the literal sense of being
self-less. It was only through selflessness that she could maintain ties with her parents.
Ellen’s traumatic treatment by her parents in response to expressions of a self led to a
dilemma. On the one hand, her survival as a child depended on people perceived to be too
dangerous to be close to because of their “potential to control [her] and squash [her] autonomy,”
(Clark, 1996, p. 154). On the other hand, her basic need for her caretakers remains strong as
leaving them would leave her terribly alone and vulnerable. As a result, Ellen tries to preserve
an attachment with her parents while simultaneously avoiding the terrible feelings triggered by
turning toward the relationship or away from it. She accomplishes this by emptying herself so
that she does not feel her emotions nor identify needs, and in so doing she becomes increasingly
unable to experience herself as real and authentic. This empty, inauthentic self is accepted and
reinforced by her parents, and therefore becomes “a positive alternative to the more authentic
feelings of turmoil and vacillation in attitudes about the relationship to the caretakers: it provides
a way of relating in and of itself,” (Clark, 1996, p. 155).
This dynamic follows the pattern of a pathogenic belief. A pathogenic belief involves an
observation of a traumatic event, assumptions about that observation, an attempt to adapt to the
environment based on those assumptions, then the assessment of whether the adaptation was
successful. In Ellen’s case, she observes that expressions of having her own needs and feelings
put her in danger of being attacked or ignored and abandoned. Since it appeared to her that
having a self of her own was a source of suffering, she responded by emptying herself. She then
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observed the accepting response from her parents, leading to the assessment that being empty
allows her to avoid the miserable pain of rejection or abuse and to maintain ties to her caregivers.
While this conclusion is essentially true for that particular dysfunctional relationship, the
problem comes when it is generalized to her other relationships, hence becoming a pathogenic
belief. Having its genesis in distorted, traumatic childhood environments, these beliefs lead to
dysfunction and suffering in adulthood. Ellen’s tendency to engage in self-negating behavior in
her life, including with her therapist, is an example of this over-generalization. One of Ellen’s
pathogenic beliefs about her self could be phrased in the following way: “Having a self is
dangerous. In order to be safe I must suppress and get rid of my self.” While the actual
emptying of herself may be seen as a defense, it is based on this pathogenic belief (a belief that,
of course, was true of living with her parents). Furthermore, as this emptying becomes a more
ingrained part of her, she experiences herself as empty, having no particular interests, needs or
desires, being incapable of giving or receiving love, etc. This may also be seen as a pathogenic
belief that denies the existence of these capacities: “I have no interests, I cannot love,” and so
forth.
Having established pathogenic emptiness as a form of pathogenic belief, pathogenic
emptiness can now be segmented into four rough stages of a pathogenic belief: formation,
reinforcement, and disconfirmation. Given these basic stages, it is now possible to “zoom in”
using the finer-grained formulations of Abhidhamma: mind-moments and their mental factors,
and the cognitive processes they belong to.
Pathogenic beliefs are complex phenomena, and represent patterns of thought and
behavior that span a long period of time (years) in someone’s life. On the contrary, the basic unit
of a mind-moment is thought to last less than the duration of a blink of an eye. Since mind-
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moments occur in such an infinitesimal span of time (Bodhi, 2000), it is when these mindmoments emerge in larger patterns that create observable behavior that we may call “symptoms”;
when someone has pervasive patterns of unwholesome mind-moments, they constitute mental
illness. Conversely, when they’re wholesome mind-moments, they constitute mental wellness.
This is similar to how, in a pointillist painting, tiny points of individual colors construct and
influence an overall shade to the subject. Therefore, it is justified to restrict our discussion to
those key mind-moments within the cognitive processes that play the most significant roles in
belief formation, reinforcement, and disconfirmation.
Mind-Moments and the Formation of Pathogenic Emptiness
In the formation of pathogenic beliefs, the most significant mind-moments will have
“unwholesome roots,” referring to the type of kamma that is involved. This is indicated by the
mere fact that pathogenic beliefs are just that—pathogenic, literally “suffering-causing.” Since
according to Abhidhamma all suffering is attributable to mind-moments with unwholesome roots
(Bodhi, 2000), it follows that mind-moments involved in pathogenic beliefs also have their basis
in unwholesome roots (desire, aversion, and delusion/bewilderment).
Recall from Chapter IV that mind-moments with such ethical valence come in two forms:
kamma-producing and kamma-resultant mind-moments. These refer to cause and effect
relationships between mind-moments. Kamma-producing mind-moments play a large role in the
formation of pathogenic beliefs. They represent the volitional response of the individual to the
object of cognition. Since according to CMT pathogenic beliefs begin with traumatic
experiences, we can model the belief as a volitional response to an external object, the traumatic
experience. Even though the Abhidhamma does not speak specifically of trauma, it is clear that
the object of cognition causing the trauma, at least in the present context of pathogenic beliefs, is
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an external one experienced through the five senses. This indicates the presence of the five-door
cognitive process, with its object being a trauma that is seen, heard, felt, or otherwise perceived
through the five senses. To recap, the mind-moments of the five-door cognitive process are, in
sequence: (1) adverting, (2) sensing, (3) receiving, (4) investigating, (5) determining, (6-12)
javanas, (13-14) registration (Bodhi, 2000). However, as we shall see, in this model the initial
stimulus is not inherently traumatic but it is through the cognitive process, and the kammic
actions within it, that create the psychological effects of trauma.
According to Abhidhamma, in the phases prior to investigating, the object is not yet
experienced as trauma. The only types of mind-moments that these phases may consist of are
the so-called “functional” mind-moments. These are described as being “accompanied by”
either equanimity or “smile-producing” consciousness rather than by pain or displeasure. This
points to the fact that in Buddhism, the experience itself does not inherently cause suffering, but
it is in later mind-moments, through the influence of kamma and our own volitional processes,
that suffering is experienced.
In the investigating and determining phases, our perception of the (otherwise neutral)
object is now subject to the effects of kamma and is potentially influenced by the forces of
desire, aversion, or delusion. It is here that physical pain becomes psychic suffering, for
example by the strong aversion to pain and wish for it to be gone, or a child’s desperate clinging
or longing for a caregiver who is in the act of rejecting or abusing her. One must be careful not
to apply what has become the “pop culture” understanding of karma here as “good” or “bad.” It
is not morally bad, and in fact it is natural and generally adaptive for a child to have a very
strong and idealizing attachment to her caregivers. But her action is influenced by forces
deemed by Buddhism to lead to suffering. These forces are intrinsic to our existence even from
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birth into this world2—from birth, a child will be influenced by the unwholesome root of
ignorance (delusion) until she has gained wisdom and knowledge from learning and experience.
Until then, many of her actions will be done with some lack of understanding of the world.
During the volitional (javana) phases of the five-door cognitive process, the individual
engages in some sort of response to the stimulus. When a response is rooted in desire, aversion,
or delusion the unwholesome kamma impacts future mind-moments with suffering. This is the
case when someone forms a pathogenic belief. Since pathogenic beliefs are often an attempt by
a child to maintain ties to her caregivers in a dysfunctional relationship, one may say that these
volitional moments are subject to unwholesome kamma rooted in desire (or clinging). The
child’s response seems drastic in that it modifies their very perception of the situation, for
example shifting blame from the caregiver to herself.
In the cognitive processes involved with the formation of a pathogenic belief about
emptiness, having responded in the javana phase in a way that negates the self, the resulting
kamma would manifest in future investigating phase that precedes the determining phase. This
resultant mind-moment would influence an individual’s perception of new events. This
influence is a distortion from viewing the event “as-is.” The individual is interpreting the present
in light of past responses, and as such it is influenced by the unwholesome root of delusion.
Therefore, in the javana phases one is attempting to adapt to one’s interpretation of the object
rather than the object itself. This cyclical application of a distorted response is the adaptation
and, in effect, represents the formation of a pathogenic belief.
Ellen’s pathogenic emptiness, like most pathogenic beliefs, is also formed in response to
traumatic experiences with her caregivers. Ellen’s experience of her mother’s emotional

2

See Bodhi’s 2006 discussion of dependent origination, pp. 312-316.
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abandonment and her father’s abuse would have been experienced through 5-door cognitive
processes. Her adaptation in the javanas was at times out of her desire to maintain ties, and this
“unwholesome” root influenced the psychological response of “emptying” herself. At other
times, the adaptation was to avoid pain or survive (even in a psychological sense). This
represents another unwholesome root of aversion.
Let us follow this process in more detail. One may assume that as a child Ellen was
subject to the common and developmentally-linked “distortion” of omnipotent control. This may
be said to be a kammic influence in the investigating and determining phases. In the moments
when Ellen’s expressing of an individual self provokes her father to attack her, she may therefore
conclude that she it is her fault due to having and expressing a self. This would occur in the
determining phase where the object is recognized and attached to concepts, and a conclusion is
drawn concerning the object or what is happening. During the following javana phases, she
responds in a way that protects her from her father, or maintains a sense of closeness with her
mother, but also generates future suffering: she suppresses her self and becomes empty. Ellen’s
trauma, then, is the experience of pain from her parents, which she determines to be her fault.
She perceives the presence of her self to be the problem, and all of this is based on her
developmental imperative to maintain bonds with her parents and also her developmentallyappropriate but unwholesome-kamma-producing delusion of omnipotent responsibility. She
responds by emptying herself in order to maintain those bonds. As a result, she does not feel her
emotions nor identify needs, and in so doing she becomes increasingly unable to experience
herself as real and authentic. This empty, inauthentic self is accepted and reinforced by her
parents, and therefore becomes “a positive alternative to the more authentic feelings of turmoil
and vacillation in attitudes about the relationship to the caretakers: it provides a way of relating
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in and of itself” (Clark, 1996, p. 155). So while maintaining bonds with her parents is crucial for
survival and therefore adaptive, the method through which this happens is influenced by
unwholesome roots and will cause future suffering.
Mind-Moments and the Reinforcement of Pathogenic Emptiness
Kamma-producing mind-moments are the active moments where suffering is either
produced or cut off. Therefore, they are responsible for the formation of pathogenic beliefs. On
the other hand, kamma-resultant mind-moments are influenced by the unwholesome roots and
feel the effects of suffering. Therefore, these are where the influence of pathogenic beliefs is
expressed. Reinforcement of pathogenic emptiness occurs through a mutual feedback loop that
occurs between kamma-producing and resultant mind-moments repeated over long spans of time.
It has already been noted that resultant mind-moments have a distorting effect on the
investigating phase of the five-door process. This also explains the effect of pathogenic beliefs;
they influence through kamma the resultant mind-moment of the investigating phase, causing the
individual to view the object of perception through a lens distorted by this belief. Resultant
mind-moments do not themselves produce kamma, they are only the result of kamma produced
previously. Therefore they are called “rootless.” The three mental factors at play besides the
universals (listed in Chapter IV) are initial application, sustained application, and decision.
Initial application and sustained application refer to the mind’s focus on the object, and decision
characterizes the actual act of investigating, i.e. “deciding” what it is that is being experienced.
Given the distorting effect of the pathogenic belief on the investigating mind-moment, it is likely
that, having misperceived the object of perception in this way, this person will respond during
the javanas in ways that are influenced by the pathogenic belief. Therefore, mind-moments that
produce unwholesome kamma are rooted in delusion, with that delusion being the pathogenic
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belief. The kamma produced by these mind-moments in turn will influence future resultant
mind-moments, continuing the cycle and reinforcing the pathogenic belief.
The strength of the object of consciousness is also a factor in this reinforcement. Recall
that a strong stimulus results in two registration mind-moments following the javanas.
Interpersonal experiences resulting in trauma would most certainly be considered a strong object.
According to Abhidhamma, registration mind-moments have the same kamma as the
investigating mind-moment, i.e. the moment influenced by the pathogenic belief. Therefore, if
the object being experienced is traumatic (strong), those registration mind-moments will serve to
further solidify the pathogenic belief. In other words, the investigation and registration mindmoments are all influenced by the pathogenic belief, the first affecting the person’s perception of
an object, the last affecting that person’s internalization of the object. The lasting impact of
trauma is almost universally accepted, and the presence of these final two mind-moments attests
to this. That impact is felt when the fruition of that kamma emerges in future, resultant, mindmoments—the pathogenic belief becomes stronger when the individual continues to experience
trauma that re-confirms it.
In Ellen’s case, she forms the belief that she must be devoid of a self in order to be safe.
She then interprets future relationships in the light of this pathogenic belief; if she somehow
triggers her father’s wrath, for example, she may attribute it to some emerging need or something
else attributable to the presence of a self. This reaffirms the belief that having a self is dangerous
and she must empty herself. But I also noted earlier that this belief, as it becomes entrenched,
transforms into an experience of herself as empty, having no interests, needs, desires, incapable
of love, etc. This translates into another pathogenic belief that she is empty or has emptied
herself. This appears to be an instance of a pathogenic belief being generated from another,
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indicating that in the mind-moments involved in developing this secondary belief, the object of
cognition originates in the mind. This is a case of the mind-door cognitive process. The object
of this cognitive process is the pathogenic belief that she must be empty to be safe. From
examining this belief, she concludes that she has therefore become empty, setting in motion the
kammic sequence described above for the generation of a new pathogenic belief (or a
transformation of the original). This process plays a very important role in the disconfirmation
of pathogenic beliefs, and I discuss it in more detail in the following section.
Disconfirmation of Pathogenic Emptiness
According CMT, an individual works to disconfirm their pathogenic beliefs through
testing. Developing, as it has, out of the view that mastery is a fundamental drive, people are
constantly working to overcome pathogenic beliefs that are causing them suffering. This implies
that at least on an unconscious level, they are aware of their pathogenic beliefs and understand
that their suffering is caused by them. Testing is the means through which they “study” their
pathogenic beliefs by in various ways replaying the traumatic situations that lead to their
formation, at times assuming their original roles in transference tests, and at other times
assuming the role of those whom they felt traumatized by in passive-into-active tests.
Mind-moments of testing. How can this testing be understood in light of the mindmoments and cognitive processes described above? To begin with, that testing is a form of
“investigation” of pathogenic beliefs, and that some, even if unconscious, awareness of the
pathogenic beliefs is implied points to the involvement of the mind-door process. Instead of
taking an external sensory experience as its object, the mind-door process takes mental
constructs as its object. One can then conclude that mind-door processes would, by necessity,
play a significant role in any moment when testing is happening.
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The mind-door process is distinct from the five-door process in that there is only one
phase, adverting, that precedes the javana phases. To recap, the mind-moments of the minddoor cognitive process are, in sequence: (1) adverting, (2-8) javanas, (9-10) registration (Bodhi,
2000). Adverting belongs to a class of mind-moments referred to as functional, meaning it is
neither directly impacted by kamma nor does it create kamma (wholesome nor unwholesome).
Therefore the kammic action occurring in the javana is unencumbered by distortion. This is
especially significant as it implies that when one examines, say, one’s own pathogenic beliefs, by
definition one cannot at the same time be distorted by that belief (at least not in that same
cognitive process). Therefore the actions taken in the javana are a response to the “thing-initself” of the mental representation.
Since the javana phases are where volitional actions take place, it is in these phases of the
mind-door cognitive process where testing would originate. The pathogenic belief is taken as the
object of cognition in the adverting phase, then, in the javanas the decision is made to question
the belief and validate it in the external world (for example, with the therapist). This leads to the
actual execution of the test by the individual. Following this, the five-door cognitive process
once again comes to the fore in order to process the responses of the other person(s) to the test—
observing facial expressions, body language, listening to verbal responses, etc. Then once again,
in the javana phases of this process, the individual takes “action” on that input and the
pathogenic belief is either weakened or reinforced.
Just as with the five-door process, in the mind-door process two registration mindmoments occur when the stimulus is strong. In the mind-door process, the registration mindmoments are instances of investigating mind-moments. These are influenced by kamma and this
represents the difficulty of internalizing our insights into particularly wounded or pernicious
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parts of ourselves without, for example, framing them within our pathogenic beliefs.
Mind-moments involved with testing would mostly be wholesome, since they derive
from the individual’s drive for mastery over their suffering. Many of the mental factors in
wholesome mind-moments seem to play an important role in mastery: 1) mindfulness—the
individual is paying attention to what she wishes to master, 2) non-aversion—aversion would be
antithetical to mastery, and 3) the path factor of right action—taking beneficial action that
moves one toward the cessation of suffering (Bodhi, 2000). If the individual perceives the test as
having been passed, then the mind-moments involved in weakening the pathogenic beliefs would
also be wholesome, with the following mental factors playing a prominent role: 1) wisdom
faculty—this leads to new insight, and 2) appreciative joy (Bodhi, 2000). This last mental factor
may be correlated to what Weiss (1993) has put forth as one of the telltale signs of a passed test:
the observable reaction of becoming relaxed, uplifted, and often revealing new insights into her
situation.
The presence of the “path factor” is also an indication of a move toward sunyata. By
definition, this indicates a movement away from pathogenic beliefs about the self, and leading to
the disconfirmation of pathogenic emptiness. This seems to imply that within any moment in
which there is a passed test, having moved away from unwholesome roots, there is the potential
for moving toward a wholesome self-experience of sunyata. This is logical within the Buddhist
framework since the singular definition of mental health is that experience of emptiness,
therefore any movement away from “illness” is naturally a move toward sunyata.
Testing pathogenic emptiness. Having established the mind-moments that are involved
in testing and disconfirmation of pathogenic beliefs, I will now inquire into what specific kind of
testing would be done to disconfirm pathogenic emptiness. It is difficult generalize this because
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of how closely tied testing is to the specific situations that caused the pathogenic belief to take
hold. Thus even if we were to pinpoint a limited number of types of pathogenic emptiness, the
specific tests that may be used to disconfirm them are as varied as the people on earth. It is
helpful, then, to turn back to our specific example of Ellen to illustrate how testing, in her case,
served to disconfirm pathogenic emptiness.
Clark (1996) was not using a CMT framework when working with Ellen, or in presenting
her case material, but she does make use of basic ego psychology. In particular, she referred to
Ellen’s use of defenses, including projective identification. Just as Ellen’s defensive use of
emptiness is tied with pathogenic beliefs about her self, her use of the defense of projective
identification is tied with her attempts to disconfirm these beliefs through testing. Projective
identification is the process through which an unwanted or threatening aspect of the self is
projected unto another, and that person is experienced as having those traits.
Since that which is projected is a segment of the self, a connection to the expelled part is
maintained, through an unconscious identification. The projected psychic content is not
simply gone; the person struggles to keep some connection to and control over that
content. (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 101)
Moreover, the person who is projected upon is often induced or influenced to feel or behave in
ways that confirm this identification.
In Clark’s (1996) assessment of Ellen there were two complimentary parts of herself tied
with her fears about having and expressing a self. On one hand Ellen feared being controlled or
destroyed by a sadistic object. To rid herself of this impotent and vulnerable part of herself, she
projected it unto the therapist while Ellen herself assumed a cruel and contemptuous role. On the
other hand, Clark (1996) felt that Ellen also projected her sadistic and controlling part onto the
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therapist at the same time she became submissive and empty. The author also notes the
provocative quality of Ellen’s submissiveness.
Many qualities of Ellen’s use of projective identification support the possibility that she
tested her therapist using both passive-into-active and transference testing. In projective
identification, the therapist often finds herself experiencing powerful negative feelings that don’t
seem to come from within. This experience is also one of the primary circumstances identified
by Weiss (1993) that may signal to the therapist that a test is occurring—when a client “behaves
in such a way as to arouse powerful feelings in the therapist—for example, by being
provocatively boring, contemptuous, seductive, or impossible” (p. 95). Moreover,
The patient who disturbs the therapist is almost always turning passive into active; that is,
he is testing the therapist by behaving as a parent or older sibling behaved toward him.
He hopes that the therapist will not be crushed by his behavior as he was crushed by a
parent’s or sibling’s behavior. In most instances the patient is also transferring…
[hoping] that despite his disturbing behavior, the therapist will not reject him by giving
up on him. (Weiss, 1993, p. 113)
It is conceivable, then, that Ellen’s use of projective identification was in fact a way for her to
test her pathogenic beliefs. She did so by introducing into the therapeutic relationship the
traumatic relational dynamic that originally caused her to form pathogenic beliefs about her
empty self. She alternated projecting different roles onto the therapist and assumed the opposite
role. When Ellen projected the impotent and vulnerable parts of herself onto her therapist, she
herself became “cold, supercilious… with a hint of cruelty and contempt” (Clark, 1996, p. 158).
This made her therapist feel “controlled by her and, in response, helpless and impotently
enraged” (Clark, 1996, p. 161). Conversely, when she projected the sadistic and controlling
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parts (internalized from her parents) on the other, she became “fluttery, dithering, [and]
provocatively air-headed” (Clark, 1996, p.161). This, in turn, elicited in her therapist “a
powerful urge to sadistically attack her” (Clark, 1996, p. 161). These alternating roles between
Ellen and her therapist through projective identification were manifestations of the two modes of
tests; in the former case, Ellen was using passive-into-active testing while in the latter, she was
using transference testing.
Ellen’s immediate responses to Clark’s (1996) interventions in these moments of testing
indicate that these interventions passed Ellen’s tests. When Clark (1996) experienced feelings of
either sadism or impotence, instead of acting on these feelings she responded by asking Ellen
how she was feeling, and at times by interpreting Ellen’s behavior as her way of “revealing and
not revealing herself simultaneously,” (p. 161). Ellen’s response shows clear signs of a passed
test:
First she tried to control the behaviors and then she was able to express her hatred and
hostility toward me directly. Most of this hatred was generated by her fantasy that, if I
knew her, I controlled her. When she noticed that her expressions of anger failed to
provoke retaliation, she became more able to identify and express all her feelings
[emphasis added]. (Clark, 1996, p. 161)
As stated earlier, one of the signs of a passed test is when the client response by becoming more
relaxed and insightful (Weiss, 1993). Ellen’s expression of her feelings was both evidence of
insight and a clear sign that her pathogenic beliefs about the dangers of doing so were weakened.
She used both transference and passive-into-active testing to disconfirm her belief that
expressing her feelings, or even having feelings of her own, is dangerous. Clark (1996) passed
these tests with her attitude just as much as, if not more than, her interpretations. According to
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CMT, interpretations “are only useful to the extent that they disconfirm the patient’s specific
pathogenic beliefs” (Silberschatz, 2005, p. 11). The author’s interpretation that Ellen was
finding ways to hide her feelings may have implied to Ellen the therapist’s acceptance of her
feelings and the expression of them. It seemed equally effective for the author simply to inquire
about how Ellen was feeling in those moments. In other words, by simply showing benign
interest in Ellen’s feelings, Clark (1996) was responding to her in a way that directly
disconfirmed her beliefs that she would be harmed, controlled, or rejected for having and
expressing them.
After these passed tests, Ellen continued using projective identification, something for
which her therapist expressed concern. The nature of this projection changed, however, and that
seems to imply that Ellen was engaged in testing a different aspect of her pathogenic beliefs
around emptiness. Instead of feeling “sadistically engaged,” her therapist felt bored and sleepy,
at times struggling to stay awake. Clark’s (1996) own words precisely describe the nature of this
transference test and the pathogenic beliefs beneath it:
Hard as it was to bear, I thought that my sleepiness was, in fact, a good sign. Ellen
was on the move, trying more boldly to express her feelings and needs. In other
words, she was becoming more separate and autonomous. Correspondingly,
feelings of abandonment by a bored, indifferent, and unresponsive image of her
mother were emerging… I was being induced to reenact the mother who slept
through Ellen’s psychological awakening and who, by failing to notice and support
that awakening, made it too terrifying and shaming for Ellen to continue to express
herself. (Clark, 1996, p. 162)
The therapist’s intervention in these moments was the same as before: she would simply ask
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Ellen how she was feeling. In this case, Ellen responded by revealing her feeling of aloneness
and terrifying emptiness, the emptiness of “shouting into space” with no response (Clark, 1996,
p. 162). Once again we see that the response of the therapist to the projective identification
evokes a positive response in the client, allowing her to access and discuss her experience with
some insight.
In this case, Ellen was testing a deeper, more vulnerable aspect of her pathogenic
emptiness. This makes the test itself more dangerous should it fail. Whereas before she tested
with her therapist the defensive aspect of her emptiness—of whether or not she must repress or
empty herself of a self—now she was testing the profound emptiness she felt from not having her
emerging self nurtured or supported as a child. This is the pathogenic emptiness associated with
the deficiency in the development of her sense of self (Singer, 1977a). Due to just how deep and
vulnerable this particular emptiness was, it could only be tested after safety was established
through the therapist’s passing of her earlier tests.
Sunyata and Healing
Disconfirmation of pathogenic emptiness, in the end, appears to result in a more nuanced
self-experience that, though it may not be the experience of sunyata, is at least a movement in
that direction. The mental factor of wisdom is present in the mind-moments that weaken the
pathogenic beliefs. It has a particular meaning in Abhidhamma as insight into the three marks of
existence: impermanence, suffering, and non-self. In Chapter III sunyata is described as a
middle way that neither reifies nor denies the self. Instead, sunyata involves a nuanced
understanding of the self as having “a momentary reality of its own in the ongoing flux of
change and transformation” (Engler, 2003, p. 76). The techniques of CMT do not put forth
specific recommendations about working with pathogenic beliefs about the self. A therapist
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working in this modality starts from the presumption of a drive for mastery, and expects that the
client has both the problem and the solution, and the therapist is there mostly to create a safe
environment and to pass tests. However, the therapist’s own assumptions about what it means to
have a healthy sense of self would influence her understanding about the nature tests that are
occurring, the pathogenic beliefs being tested, and most importantly the correct response that
passes the test. It is easy to see how this could influence which pathogenic beliefs about the self
are disconfirmed or reinforced. Take, for example, a client who has pathogenic beliefs about the
self at the opposite end of the spectrum, experiencing rigid boundaries of self, a sense of
permanence, separation. Rather than providing comfort, for this client it results in feelings of
“otherness” and aloneness. While the therapist will easily recognize the symptoms, she may not
recognize the nature of the test if this reflects her unconscious beliefs about the self. She may
“fail” these tests by responding in ways that reaffirm the pathogenic self-experience of her client.
Yet despite this, working within a theoretical framework that incorporates Buddhism and
CMT, and focusing just on the phenomenon at hand—empty self-experience—the observation
that disconfirmation appears to naturally lead toward sunyata is striking; and we find evidence
for this even in the case of Ellen.
Ellen’s example. As passed tests serve to weaken Ellen’s pathogenic beliefs about
emptiness, and she gradually begins to abandon them. What emerges is a self that is full of
confusing ambivalence and contradictions, which at first she finds difficult to tolerate. But she is
able to tolerate them more in more having been provided a safe environment to do so. Having
moved from emptiness as “not having any self” she is now ready to have a self but is struggling
to pin down what that is. The ambivalence seems to her to be an obstacle to that at first. As time
goes on she learns to allow the ambivalence to exist and to accept multiple, fluid, and
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contradictory parts of herself as that self. According to Clark (1996), Ellen came to recognize
the importance of experiencing her shifting, contrary wants and needs as a pathway to
separation/individuation, and her “correct experience of that perception as the doorway to her
dawning recognition of the nature of her real self” (p. 164). Ellen expresses this in her own
words:
There are a lot of different feelings in me, and I am beginning to accept it. I am
beginning to enjoy the day, maybe not even a day, maybe a moment when I feel joy,
knowing that there may be utter turmoil in the next moment, because I can accept the
turmoil. Because of this, I feel a bit more spontaneous, more social, more relaxed.
(Clark, 1996, p. 165)
This sounds remarkably close to a Buddhist understanding of mental health. The
spontaneity and effortlessness of action was also reported by Tarrant (2007) in discussing his
experiences with sunyata, characterizing his actions as “blowing out from the depths.” Wisdom,
which as we noted is present in the mind-moments that weaken the pathogenic beliefs, is defined
specifically in reference to insight into the three marks of existence: impermanence, suffering,
and non-self. We also see Ellen’s insight into the “three marks of existence”—she experiences a
real, existent self that is not fixed, rather it is in flux. Insight into non-self means both not
reifying the self as well as not reifying emptiness.
Her ability to tolerate this fluctuating experience of the self can be further represented in
the presence of some of the other universal, so-called “beautiful,” factors of wholesome mindmoments: tranquility, malleability, wieldiness, neutrality, non-greed (desire, for example, in
wishing things to be some way that they are not). Just as with the reinforcement of pathogenic
beliefs, this non-pathogenic self-experience of sunyata is subject to the same process, becoming
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a part of a reinforcing cycle of wholesome kammic influence on perception. This is what
eventually leads to type of consciousness seen in Buddhism as irreversibly leading to liberation
from suffering, consisting of the supramundane mind-moments referred someone esoterically as
stream entry, once-returning, non-returning, and arahantship3. However, this ultimate liberation
from suffering is only possible through meditative practice. Although the essential role
meditation plays in Buddhism may not find an equally venerated position in clinical practice,
examining its elemental presence in mind-moments involved in disconfirming pathogenic
emptiness, it could perform a beneficial adjunct role to therapy performed in a CMT framework.
Meditation. In all of the wholesome mind-moments involved in the disconfirmation of
pathogenic emptiness, mindfulness and the other elements of meditation are present: wisdom,
non-aversion, initial application, and sustained application. Since testing depends on the
individual’s ability to observe, even at an unconscious level, their own pathogenic beliefs in
order to test and disconfirm them, these factors would play a key role in these mind-moments.
Recall that the adverting phase is a functional mind-moment, devoid of kammic influence. This
implies that in the cognitive process when one is examining a pathogenic belief, one cannot at
the same time be distorted by that belief within that same cognitive process. In other words, at
the precise moment where pathogenic emptiness is being examined, one is essentially free of its
grasp. Furthermore, the meditative practices of samatha and vipassana are said to increase the
intensity of these mental factors (Bodhi, 2000; Olendzki, 2008). It may therefore be surmised
that meditation could make the process of disconfirming pathogenic beliefs more efficient by
increasing the efficacy of the mind-moments responsible for testing and disconfirming these

3

Arahant literally means “worthy one” and is traditionally used to refer to very advanced
Buddhist practitioners who have eliminated all trace of kamma, wholesome or unwholesome, and
therefore have become free from the forces of causation and will not be reborn upon death.
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beliefs. Concerted effort to engage in a meditative practice could therefore be an effective way
of increasing the potency of a CMT-based intervention.
This applies even more so in the specific case of pathogenic emptiness. This is due to
Buddhist practice’s predominant focus on understanding the nature of the self. Employing
meditation from this tradition, including the practice of taking the three marks of existence as a
meditation subject in vipassana, suggests that the primary pathogenic beliefs that will be
examined will be those about the nature of the self.
Implications for Practice and Research
In this study, I set out to examine empty self-experience in both its pathogenic form and
in its beneficial form known as sunyata. The goal was to determine what relationship might
exist between them and the implications for clinical social work practice.
My investigation into the phenomena of pathogenic emptiness and sunyata began with an
observation that pathogenic emptiness involves a cognitive framework that has the traits of a
pathogenic belief. In observing this, pathogenic emptiness could then be divided into four basic
stages that apply to pathogenic beliefs: formation, reinforcement, and disconfirmation. Using
Abhidhamma, each of these four stages were then broken down even further into “atomic” parts
of consciousness: cognitive processes, mind-moments, and mental factors. Through this process
I was able to relate the lifecycle of pathogenic emptiness to the process of achieving sunyata.
The case of Ellen illuminated the integral role that testing, a core CMT idea, had in her
own healing. This is already presupposed in the classical CMT understanding of testing and the
drive to mastery. We can see, however, in the case example the psychological risk involved in
testing pathogenic beliefs about the self, especially pathogenic emptiness. Therefore the tests
involved are very strong and trigger very strong emotional responses in the therapist. Since
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emptiness is so often associated with more severe pathology, it is easy to ascribe these
experiences in therapy to the client’s pathology. It is tempting, for example, to view Ellen’s
continued use of projective identification as counterproductive or evidence of a stalled
therapeutic process, as Clark (1996) had done. Instead, accepting it as the method through which
pathogenic emptiness is being tested, one understands the adaptive motivation behind it
(Silberschatz, 2005); it is a part of Ellen’s unconscious plan to heal herself of her pathogenic
beliefs and an essential part of her work in therapy. Instead of being “stuck,” by testing Ellen is
continuing to work to disconfirm other pathogenic beliefs, or other aspects of a single pathogenic
belief. This underscores an inherent clarity or wisdom implied by the very notion of mastery as a
fundamental drive.
This is also supported by the observation above of the involvement of the mind-door
process in testing. Recall that the adverting phase is a functional mind-moment, devoid of
kammic influence. This implies that in the cognitive process when one is examining a
pathogenic belief, one cannot at the same time be distorted by that belief within that same
cognitive process. In other words, at the precise moment where pathogenic emptiness is being
examined, one is essentially free of its grasp. Combined with the mental factor of right action,
not only does this accord with the view held by CMT of mastery as an innate drive, but it also
has potent implications for the use of meditation as an adjunct modality in CMT-based therapy.
In light of these findings, there are several implications for clinical social work practice.
A relationship was revealed between testing and meditation that suggests meditation may be a
beneficial adjunct to the process of disconfirming pathogenic beliefs about the self. Specifically,
the involvement of the mind-door process in testing and disconfirming pathogenic beliefs
suggests a role for meditation in expediting the disconfirmation process by strengthening the
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mindfulness mental factor within the mind-door processes responsible for testing and
disconfirming these beliefs. This appears to be a strong theoretical justification for the
systematic inclusion of meditation in CMT-based clinical social work.
More significantly is the application of this to the phenomenon at hand, the empty selfexperience. In clinical social work practice with clients suffering from pathogenic selfexperience, the CMT approach allows one to treat this as a pathogenic belief, and to design one’s
interventions so as to disconfirm these beliefs. Furthermore, in taking the three marks of
existence as meditation subjects in vipassana, Buddhist meditation is specifically targeted to
transforming one’s self-experience from pathogenic emptiness to sunyata. This suggests that
such an approach that employs the interventions of CMT and Buddhist meditation would
especially serve those experiencing this type of pathology. What remains unclear is whether the
explicit and ultimate goal of sunyata is a necessary part of this framework, or whether it suffices
to work solely with disconfirming pathogenic beliefs about emptiness.
It is helpful to imagine the outcome if Ellen engaged in Buddhist meditation in the course
of therapy focused on disconfirming her pathogenic emptiness. One might suppose a number of
things, one of which might be that her testing, having gained in efficiency through meditation,
might disconfirm her pathogenic beliefs about her self sooner. The insight into the conditioned
nature of her self that Clark (1996) mentions as an outcome of her therapy would then be a
springboard from which to continue her healing process, as the focus of vipassana meditation
into the three marks of existence. Presumably over time, through the similar reinforcing actions
of the cognitive process according to Abhidhamma, her new understanding would eventually
become an unconscious belief that becomes part of her perceptual frame and self-experience and
lead to the lived day-to-day experience of sunyata.
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This hypothesis could be tested in the future via an empirical study that compares
outcome variables of patients engaged in CMT-based therapy and vipassana meditation.
Participants would be those suffering from pathogenic emptiness (for example, those diagnosed
with schizoid personality disorder), and they would be divided into an experimental group that
also practices vipassana meditation, and a control group that does not. Aside from affirming the
usefulness of meditation in CMT’s particular therapeutic approach, such research might also be
another validation of some of the basic tenets of CMT such as the drive to mastery and the
individual’s level of control over their unconscious processes. It could also demonstrate the
viability of meditation to combat our “everyday neuroses” and suffering that result from more
subtle, and perhaps more socially accepted, forms of pathogenic emptiness or, in our society, the
opposite pole of narcissistic craving.
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